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ABSTRACT:
This study takes a critical look at citizens’ version of the economic “truth” in Cameroon, regarding the
legitimacy and authority of the state to tax them under the current conditions of governance in the
country. In this sense, it examines citizens’ perceptions of the social conditions of public governance in
Cameroon. The study argues that over the years the memory that citizens in Cameroon have about the
public governance system has been built in the negative experiences of public institutions as asphyxiating
rather than enabling, as socially irresponsible rather than responsive to their needs, and as
administratively unaccountable rather than transparent and accountable. This cushions negative
perceptions of public governance processes such as taxation. The study adopts the democratic
developmental state as a recent theoretical model in debates about state institutionalism, but grounds its
logic  even  more  in  the  concept  of  collective  or  social  memory,  which  highlights  the  impact  of  past
experiences and cultural contexts in the formation of citizens’ views or opinions (such as trust/distrust)
over issues of broad public concern, like taxation.
As a qualitative exploratory study of citizens’ trust in public institutions and its impact on their
perceptions about taxation in Cameroon, the study is based on a combination of primary and secondary
sources of data. The primary data are mainly selected newspaper articles that record and convey the
unfiltered perceptions and opinions of citizens. These are used to support analytical insights about the
relations between citizens’ perception of the complex interfaces of state institutions, the behavior of
public officials, the social conditions of Cameroonian communities and the use of tax revenue in the
country. The strength of the primary data is supported by the use of secondary sources such as published
surveys in reports and newspapers, as well as a critical review of articles and books.
The study shows that in addition to the dismal failure of public institutions at providing adequate services
to citizens, following the country’s transition to multi-party politics in 1990, the increasing activism of
some civil society groups such as well as donor efforts, have all compelled the government of Cameroon
to adopt a series of anti-corruption campaigns that have themselves been mired in contradictions. The
consequence has been a heightened sense of citizens’ distrust towards public institutions. This distrust is
framed within the narrative of citizens’ rights to public administrative accountability and services. Even
more important, these negative perceptions of the public governance system in Cameroon translate into a
deeper sense of frustration when it comes to paying taxes to a state that is seen as irresponsible and
accountable to its citizens. Given the emancipative force that Cameroon’s democratic transition in 1990
offers these civil society groups, the study concludes that increasing democratization in Cameroon and
Africa yields a deliberative space for the civil society organizations to strengthen the agenda on public
institutional reform and the transformation of the conduct of public officials towards more socially
responsible and accountable governance.
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This study is about how citizens in a central African country, Cameroon, view payment
of taxes (of any form) to the state,  in relation to their  perceptions about the use of tax
revenue in public governance in the country. The situation of public governance in
Cameroon is not very much different from the general situation in sub-Saharan Africa.
This has been described broadly as characterized by ‘catastrophic governance’, given
the current climate of entrenched corruption, poverty and social exclusion in the
continent (Joseph 2003). In this context, there exists a vast variety of ‘endemic
practices,’ which range from ‘repressive regimes, absence or superficial existence of
democratic institutions, pervasive corruption, theft, mismanagement, to inefficient
utilization of public resources.’ These have all been contributing to drive livelihoods in
the continent into the quagmire of deprivation and insecurity, leaving a strong sense of
‘regime voicelessness’ among the ordinary citizens (Murungi 2004: 9). In the absence
of practices that could pass for good governance (cf. Jackson 2000: 296), African states
have in recent times been variously termed ‘quasi,’ ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ states, as they
are seen as either unable or unwilling to assume their functions in the provision of
welfare, law and order, and security (Gros 1996: 456; Zartman 1995: 5; see Hill 2005,
for a refutation of the ‘failed state’ thesis with respect to African states).
In this perspective of state failure, the state in Africa has become the object of protests
and fierce demand-making from both organized social movements and disorganized
social and occupational groups such as teachers, students, validating the claim that in
times of economic strife the poor are “pit against the state” (Davis 1989: 227). This has
been more so since the early 1990s under the ambit of ‘democratization’, as many
African countries project recurrent dramas of violent encounters between their state
security forces and challenging social movements, such as students and women, who
oppose actions from the state and its agents that threaten their means of livelihood. For
instance, in recent times, in Africa as well as beyond, many women and youth groups
have mobilized and effectively mounted protests against the states’ incapacity to
8prevent the ever-soaring prices of basic food commodities. In the African cases such as
in Senegal, Cameroon and Egypt, these have always entailed a confrontation between
these groups and the security forces of the states.
But beyond these scenes of violence, the restoration of a minimal level of political
liberalization in the 1990s in Africa has also provided most of the citizens, hitherto
oppressed under violent, coercive and or authoritarian regimes, with a means to vocalize
their anxieties and anguish about the state of governance affecting the quality of their
lives. Subjective and objective ideas about the ‘quality of lives’ for citizens, then,
become the material or economic basis for citizens’ contentious engagement with the
state. This economic function, places the state as the central player in economic
regulation, redistribution and provision of life-sustaining services for its citizens, in
return for their recognition of its political legitimacy and authority. This image of a
contractual relation á la Hobbes provides a good entry point into the nature of state-
society relations in Africa, today.
In times of strife over the economy and its activities, the interplay between the
performance of state power (the state’s usage of its various ‘political technologies’ to
regulate the nature of economic life, such as taxation), and the interrogations and
contestations from citizens over what should be and what shouldn’t be appropriate and
legitimate “economic practices” from the state, are highlighted (see Roitman 2005:
??15). Thus, the  economy as a domain of “social practices”  (Roitman 2005: 6), is a
domain marked by a fervent struggle between the state and other economic agents, at
defining the “truths” and validity of economic practices, a struggle which affords a lens
through which local actors or people (citizens) imagine and relate to the state. While for
the state, citizens who pay taxes are “good” citizens performing their civic duties, for
the people in the society-at-large, the transparent, judicious and accountable use of tax
revenue by public institutions and public officials, means that the state is a responsible
and “good governing” state.
This study takes a critical look at citizens’ version of the economic “truth” in
Cameroon, regarding the legitimacy and authority of the state to tax them under the
9current conditions of governance in the country. In these efforts, it makes an
examination of citizens’ perceptions of the social conditions of public governance in
Cameroon, such as the contemporary culture of administration in the public institutions,
the irresponsible management of public wealth, and perceptions about the poor service
delivery by public institutions in Cameroon. Such citizens’ understanding of these social
conditions of governance in Cameroon culminates in their usually distrusting outlook
towards public institutions and public officials. Thus, the study makes a case for a
deeper understanding of citizens’ negative perception about the payment of taxes in
Cameroon, rather than simply espousing them as ‘tax evaders’ as the state would
contend. For, as Roitman (2005: 7) advances,
“By looking at the institutionalization of certain concepts and practices-for instance, the
institutionalization of “tax” and “price” in Cameroon- we can glimpse the various ways in which
specific economic concepts and metaphors have been assumed and performed by local actors. And
by studying the institutionalization of these concepts or historical institutions, we see how their
practices involve various modalities or how they are both assumed and yet also disputed as forms
of knowledge, which carry political and socio-economic consequences for those involved.”
It is in this regard suggestive of the fact that the authority of the state is essentially about
enhancing its strength and capability, that is, the ability of the state to plan and execute
policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently (Fukuyama 2004: 5). Once this
authority is contested its basis is sapped. Therefore, the crucial issue for the state and its
institutions lies in them being seen as legitimate in the eyes of those it governs. But
there is an increasing crisis of legitimacy in Cameroon, a crisis that is buttressed by the
growing sense of disillusionment among the citizens about government performance.
The study is an effort to use these perceptions to contribute towards the discussion of
how public administration can still play a vital role in building state capacity in
Cameroon in particular and Africa in general, by securing the trust of its citizens and
building broad-based commitments to its clientele- the public.
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1.2. Thesis Statement
In the backdrop of the issues of public institutions and trust, some have argued that the
level of trust that people have in an organization affects their eventual relation with and
usage of the services provided by that organization (Duffy, Browning & Skinner 2003),
and eventually their final relations with such organizations or institutions. Also,
meaningful progress has been made towards the understanding of the nature of trust and
trust-based bahavior, with respect to relations between people and institutions (Meehan
& Grimsley 2003; Grimsley, Meehan & Tan 2007). Seen in this light, trust can
appropriately be considered as a form of social capital (cf. Putnam 1993; Rose-
Ackerman 2001), which becomes a crucial element in building or strengthening state or
institutional capacity.
According to Rose-Ackermann (2001: 538), research on trust can be organized either in
terms of interrelations between people (generalized trust) or in terms of the sources of
individuals’ trusting or distrusting attitudes. This study proposes to follow on the latter
line of enquiry. Following Rothstein (2000; 2001a), the study argues that over the years
the memory that citizens in Cameroon have about the public governance system has
been built in the negative experiences of public institutions as asphyxiating rather than
enabling, as socially irresponsible rather than responsive to their needs, and as
administratively unaccountable rather than transparent and accountable, thus creating
negative perceptions of public governances processes such as taxation. These negative
experiences about corruption and embezzlements in public institutions have been
instrumental in shaping citizens’ perceptions of taxation in Cameroon. Furthermore, the
study makes the related claim that the modest shift towards democratization in
Cameroon since the 1990s has offered some new space for civil society groups to start
demanding greater transparency, accountability and responsibility in public institutions.
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1.3. Research Questions
In the light of this argument, the present study poses the following research
questions:
- what is the impact of citizens’ assessment of the relation between public
administration in Cameroon and its clientele-the citizens, over the long term, in
relation to  the behavior of public officials and the use of public revenue?
- how do the social conditions of governance in Cameroon, such as a culture of
corruption in public institutions and perceived inefficiency in meeting citizens’
needs, work to create, sustain or erode citizens’ trust or distrust in public
institutions and public officials in Cameroon?
- finally, in broad terms, how does citizen’s trust in public institutions connect to
the more vexed concerns of political and administrative accountability in
governance  in Cameroon?
1.4. Objectives
This is a study of citizens’ perceptions of their daily relations and transactions with their
public institutions and the services which these offer, and through this, their evaluation
of these relations with public institutions in terms of their perceptions of the act of
paying taxes to the state in Cameroon. Specifically, the study will seek to understand:
i) the reasons framing citizen’s evaluations of trust or distrust in the public institutions
in Cameroon ;
ii) the link between such citizens’ distrust (or the existence of such trust) and their
perceptions about paying taxes-paying attitudes of citizens;
iii) the implications of such lack of or existence of citizens’ trust  in public institutions
for their evaluation of  the level of administrative accountability in public services in
Cameroon.
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1.5. Methodology: Types of Data and Methods of Collection
This study is a qualitative exploration of citizens’ trust in public institutions and its
impact on their perceptions about taxation in Cameroon. Thus, the study is based on a
combination of primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data are mainly
newspaper articles that record and convey citizens’ perceptions and opinions about
public institutions and taxation in Cameroon, obtained both electronically through the
internet and by conventional print editions. These primary data, consisting of unfiltered
or unprocessed opinions expressed by citizens in the local and international press, are
used to support analytical insights about the relations between citizens’ perception of
the complex interfaces of state institutions, the behavior of public officials, the social
conditions of Cameroonian communities and the use of tax revenue in the country.
The strength of the primary data is supported by the use of secondary sources such as
published surveys in reports and newspapers, as well as a critical review of articles and
books. The latter helped in both the construction of an analytical framework as well as
the couching of the study within existing discussions on the issues of trust and
efficiency in public institutions, as well as the role of democracy and development
narratives in framing citizen’s perceptions of taxation within the state.
The absence of vivid interviews about citizens’ perceptions is, however, partially
compensated  by  the  fact  that  the  review  of  primary  sources  draws  from  actual  public
opinion surveys mentioned earlier, even though this limitation is not totally
circumvented.
1.6. Organization of the Study
Beside this introductory chapter, the rest of this study is organized in five chapters. The
next chapter builds an analytical framework that fuses the theory of a democratic
developmental state to the concept of collective or social memory. It is aimed at
uncovering how citizens’ trust and perceptions about public institutions and
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bureaucratic processes such as taxation are framed by the narratives of development and
democracy, on the one hand, and their long-term interaction with public institutions and
public officials, on the other. The third chapter reviews vital empirical linkages between
the citizens’ development needs, the need to maintain the democratic values of
transparency and accountability in public institutions, the intricate processes that build
or erode trust and how these all help to shape citizens’ views of taxation from the state.
The fourth chapter contextualizes the historical background of public governance in the
late colonial and early postcolonial state in Cameroon, tracking the various processes
that have been building a distinct social memory about its failure and inefficiency in
meeting citizens’ needs. The fifth chapter outlines and critically analyzes the processes
of corruption and failure in the public bureaucracy in Cameroon as resulting from
widespread corruption by public officials, and shows how such mal-administration is
crucial in fostering citizen’s distrust in public institutions in Cameroon, as well as
shaping their perceptions of taxation. It also shows how this citizen’s distrust is
conveyed by the active role of civil society organizations such as the church and the
private media in making critical engagement with the problem of corruption, thus
enabling them to effectively press for social accountability. This pressure for public
institutional accountability from the society-at-large forms the basis of a concluding
chapter that advocates for increased citizen’s involvement in the policy-making and
implementation processes in Cameroon’s and Africa’s public bureaucracy, as a way to
gaining more trust  and legitimacy from citizens.
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2. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
2.1. Introduction
This study takes its cue from the observation of three main problems within Cameroon’s
public administration: obvious insufficiency in public service provision in the much
needed social amenities and infrastructure, poor quality service provision to the extent
that public institutions function at all, and finally, the most denounced pervasive extent
of corruption and misappropriation of public revenues. This chapter is aimed at
developing a possible framework for the analysis of such critical concerns. These three
problems create a high sense of disillusionment in the government and its institutions.
Hence, most important for this study is, also, the observation that the relationship
between the state of Cameroon and its citizens, as mediated by its public administration,
has over the years entrenched this strong sense of disillusionment in the government.
Such citizens’ disillusionment is a result of the recurrent inability of public institutions
to serve its citizens, while they continuously fail to inspire justice and a sense of
‘fairness in its judicial system. Until a couple of years ago, the state did not only fail to
prosecute and punish most of those public officials known to have misappropriated or
embezzled public funds with strong terms of imprisonment, but it also failed to seize
their property and other assets and return these into the public treasury. Over a period of
more than three decades this has created a deep sense of bitterness in the citizenry, over
what they see, as a culture of impunity and immunity in Cameroon’s public
administrative institutions.
As a result of both its institutional and historico-cultural background highlighted in the
above remarks on public governance in Cameroon, this study calls for both a
theoretically flexible and interdisciplinary approach to ground such institutional and
historical/cultural elements involved. This flexibility demands that elements crucial to
notions of the state and economic concerns, such as the payment of taxes and public
service provision be highlighted quite strongly within institutional and or state-building
theoretical perspectives. Yet, these must leave room for an account of the specific
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historical and cultural trajectory of the context, so as to make them valid as empirical
cases, as is the case with Cameroon. Consequently the study adopts the democratic
developmental state as a recent theoretical model in debates about state institutionalism,
but grounds its logic even more in the concept of collective or social memory (used
loosely and interchangeably). The latter highlights the impact of past experiences and
cultural contexts in the formation of citizens’ views or opinions (such as trust/distrust)
over issues of broad public concern, like taxation. Indeed, taxation as a state-led social
activity indexes the crucial element of citizens’ evaluations of the relationship between
themselves and the state over a long period of time.
In this chapter, the first part (from section 2.1.1. to 2.1.4.) of the discussion brings into
context the literature on the theory of democratic developmental state building, which
not only accords a strong society-focused perspective of government bureaucracy, but
also upholds the values of transparency, accountability and citizenship as well as
inspires trust between the state and its people. The sub-section on democratic
developmental states will begin with a review of the historical trajectory of African
states, in other to expose the nature of state-society relations that emerge. However,
given that within democratic developmentalism, is an implicit assumption of its
potential for ‘scaling up’ public institutions, this first part of the democratic
developmental state will also highlight public institutionalist perspectives implicit
within, and will attempt to connect their relevance to the relationship of the key
variables of taxation and public goods provision.
The second part (section 2.3.) of the chapter will also attempt to connect the impact of
public institutions-society interactions, in historical perspective, to the formation of
citizens’ views on present issues through the concept of “collective memory.” This
concept is increasingly popular among political scientists, within discussions on public
institutions in recent years. In this section the concept will be outlined and its
relationship to trust highlighted and both will be connected to the possibility for
elucidating citizens’ perceptions of and relations with the state’s public institutions,
following the insights of Bo Rothstein (2000; 2001a).
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2.1.1. Democratic Developmental State: Background to the Coupling of Development
with Democracy in Africa
It has been noted by several contributions on African development problems, that the
long processes of state-building and quite recently democratization, have seen a
tumultuous journey so far. Modern and politically independent efforts at state-building
in sub-Saharan Africa started only around the 1950s, while strong internal demands and
external support for political democratization began around 1990s. From its early
beginnings most state governments in Africa professed a strong determination towards
social and institutional transformation of their countries, with the object of achieving
economic development and improved conditions of living for many within the shortest
possible time. Illustratively one recalls Ghana’s first president Nkwame Nkrumah’s
(1963, cited in Yergin & Stanislaw 1998: 43) dictum, “Seek ye first the political
kingdom, and all else shall be added unto you....” and his dreams prior to independence
in the following words, “If we get self-government, we'll transform the Gold Coast into
a paradise in 10 years.” Some, such as former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere
adopted compulsory villagization as public policy for social transformation and welfare,
but his efforts did not yield much in terms of concrete improvement in living conditions.
All these recollections are meant to underpin the fact that African governments, from
early days of self-government in the 1960s, have professed commitment to improving
the lot of their people, principally through public policy that is administered by public
administrative institutions. Yet such schemes and ideologies never succeeded in
meeting the needs and aspirations of Africans and many Africans today blame the
bureaucracy that was laden with the responsibility for their administration. The
development situation in the continent worsened by the early 1970 when most of these
early post-independent governments turned intransigently authoritarian and promoted
strong cults of personality around the presidents. Both of these galvanized the impetus
which corruption and misappropriation of public resources was already gaining in
public institutions, paving the way for the unavoidable economic crisis in the continent
by the early 1980s. Some have argued that it is such a vicious circle of corruption in
public institutions on the one hand and underdevelopment on the other, that have
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generated and sustained a strong dependence on political power and the political domain
in Africa, as the main site of continuous accumulation of much needed but increasingly
diminishing bazaar of resources (cf. Szetfel 2000: 287).
Given that most countries in Africa depended on aid and loans to meet both their
domestic and external financial commitments, understandably, by the early 1980 the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) began imposing Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) for most African economies, emphasizing the need for
state disengagement by way of reduction in size of its institutions and liberalization of
the economy in favor of the market, while only providing the regulatory framework for
these markets. As these international financial institutions(IFIs) still could not see the
results of these adjustments, in terms of improved economic performance, it was
realized that it is the way government officials and civil servants behave that such
economic problems persists (see Olukoshi 1993; 1995a; 1995b; Mkandawire &
Olukoshi 1995; Szetfel 2000). That is, the same old plight of corruption and
misappropriation was sustained and even increased, following the economic hardship
occasioned by such public administrative reforms (retrenchment of civil servants and
salary-cuts) contained in the SAPs.
Consequently, in the last few years into this new decade, for the donors, the emphasis is
placed more on transparent and accountable institutional structures designed for
effective public administration, and the principal criterion for continuous donor and IFI
support has been the ‘deepening’ of democratic structures and practices. These are seen
as the best measures to ensure improvement in the quality of governance and effective
use of these resources for the enhancement of social and economic infrastructure,
required for effective development (see for example, Stokke 2006, for a recent
discussion of efforts at state building in “failed” and “fragile” states and their
relationship to agendas on development cooperation and assistance). A case in point is
the present insistence on effective results on improved democratic elections and the
fight against corruption, for qualification of donor support through the new IFI-
sponsored Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative.
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This background on the journey of African development history and its eventual
encounter with the democratization imperative, suggests that there is a theory that
believes in the positive contribution of democratic institutional building and
consolidation, towards resolving the present African development crisis, as opposed to
authoritarian regimes. The next section examines such subtle assumptions within the
ambit of a theoretical debate on the relationship between democracy and development.
2.1.2. The Democratic Developmental State: a Theoretical Synopsis
The current concept of the democratic developmental state is traceable to the earlier
concept which simply contemplated a “developmental state”. In quite a simple
conceptual exposition, Evans’ (1995, cited in Edigheji 2005: 85) conceives of the
developmental state as a ‘type of state’ among three possible types, the others being the
‘predatory’ and ‘intermediary’ states. At one extreme, predatory states, he contends, are
characterized by incoherent and inefficient state institutions marked by very little
capacity to promote collective goals such as economic growth and other social
development programs, for social transformation. Such a  state is noted to be grounded
in the narrow logic of neo-patrimonial rule, marked by intense corruption and
clientelistic ties, and quite often, an intentional disorganization of various organs of
society, such as the civil society, which culminate in what Karl Polanyi would
characterize as ‘dis-embeddedness’. As a matter of fact, in these states, office bearers
use the state to pursue their individual political and economic interests and it is quite
accurate to note, as Edigheji does, that the predatory states are properties of dictatorial
political leaders or a small group of political elite, be they military or civilians (Edigheji
2005: 86). Evans (1995: 45, cited in Edigheji 2005: 86) describes Mobutu's Zaire as an
appropriate example of such a state.
In between the predatory and developmental state, is the ‘intermediary state’ and
Edigheji (ibid. 86) citing the examples of India and Brazil used by Evans, describes it as
‘a paradox,’ given that it manages to combine elements that pertain to both
developmentalism and predatory rentierism. In effect, the intermediate state, unlike the
predatory state which has no organizational capacity, has a semblance of bureaucratic
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organization, but such organizations are said to lack the degree of corporate coherence
and efficiency enjoyed by the developmental state. Similarly, the bureaucracy in
intermediate states, while possessing a degree of independence from the pressures oft
induced by political elite and other special interest groups on the public bureaucrats,
however, is fraught with contradictions arising from the fragmented and unstable nature
of its internal structures. It however manages to contain what has been noted as
“pockets of efficiency” (Evans 1995, cited in Edigheji 2004: 91), which result in a better
economic outcome, than in the predatory state. Finally, at the other extreme of the
predatory state, is what Evans termed the developmental state, and it should be noted
that Evans adopted this concept from the work of Chalmers Johnson (1982, cited in
Edigheji 2004: 86) on the Japanese political economy, in which he advanced the
concept of the “capitalist developmental state”, in an attempt to ground structural and
institutional prerequisites that underpinned Japan's rapid remarkable economic
performance immediately after World War II.
According to Edigheji (2004: 86?87), the developmental state has four main
characteristics. The first is political stability, and bureaucratic autonomy, and, secondly
it initiates coordinates extensive and sustained investment in social and infrastructural
programs. The third attribute of a developmental state is its role promoting “market-
enhancing” (as opposed to “market-repressing”) economic policies. Lastly, a clear
separation of task between the state and private sector, under the aegis of the state organ
in charge of economic and industrial policy, for example a ministry of trade and
industrial policy. The first feature of political stability and an insulated bureaucracy
ensures a “technocratic” functioning of the state, in which the state, by way of the role
played by its trained and experienced bureaucrats and under a serious political and
economic agenda from the political leader of the state, governs its society and economy
with “soft authoritarianism” (Johnson 1982, cited in Edigheji 2004: 87). This attribute
of bureaucratic autonomy of the state, it is argued, is to ensure political stability and
long-term predictability of economic goals. In this context, it is implicitly assumed that
state “domination” over society and mastery of its programs for economic
transformation is marked by the benevolent will of the state to dominate and guide
society for the interest of the majority in the society like in contemporary social
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democracies in the Nordic model of the state, preventing the prevalence of the narrow
and selfish interests of a few, as the case would otherwise be under a predatory state
regime.
Thus, in summing up the basic conceptual distinctions between these three types of
state, Tanja Muller offers that a developmental state exposes “two components: one
ideological, one structural” (Muller 2008: 113). On the one hand, she follows Manuel
Castells view that structurally it ‘establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to
promote and sustain development’ (Castells 1992: 55, cited in Muller 2008: 113). On
the other hand, she follows Mkandawire’s (2001: 290) understanding of its ideological
level as a point where the governing political elite successfully establish an ‘‘ideological
hegemony,’’ so that its developmental project becomes, in a Gramscian sense, a
‘‘hegemonic’’ project to which key actors in the nation adhere voluntarily.’
Exposed as above, the developmental state is evidently statist in its approach to social
development, as the state, through its bureaucracy arrogates to itself the monopoly over
social and economic (market) policies, even if these be in the interest of the majority of
the population in a society. This is tantamount to what could be described as choiceless
development, with flow of the people’ needs streaming downward from the technocratic
elite to the people. Thus, as Edigheji would note in his review, it is quite understandable
that some scholars within network theories, such as Daniel Okimoto (1989, cited in
Edigheji 2004: 87) have criticized the strong statist conception of the developmental
state, as advanced by Johnson. Okimoto emphasizes the importance of the supportive
role of the state, rather than it being a strong economic agent by itself.
However, in contemporary scholarly debates, democratic developmental states are
understood to combine features of social and political pluralism (democracy) and the
prevalence of strong economic agents that foster the well-being of society
(development). In their developmental outlook they are constructed on the notion of
‘developmental states’ which are seen as possessing state autonomy-the existence of
coherent state agencies that are able to formulate and implement coherent economic
policies for developmental goals- as an indication of bureaucratic insulation from
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pressures exerted by political and interest-groups as well as bureaucratic coherence
(Edigheji 2004: 87). These are conceived as crucial elements upon which the state
bureaucracy relies for political stability. As such, an insulated bureaucracy ensures a
“technocratic” functioning of the state, enabling its public officials work under a serious
political and economic agenda from the political leader of the state,  and governs its
society and economy with “soft authoritarianism.” (Johnson 1982, cited in Edigheji
2004: 87.)
However, beyond this simplistic reliance on the benevolence of the state and its
government at being developmental, the ‘democratic developmental state’ recognizes
the possibility for these to deny political and social rights to its citizens, which will
breed strong feelings of social exclusion, while granting them ‘economic freedom’
associated with the promises of economic growth (for a critique of such statist positions
see for example Okimoto 1989, cited in Edigheji 2004: 87). Moreover the democratic
developmental state assumes a valid grasp of the shift in contemporary understandings
about development, from merely securing economic rights to a ‘broadening’ of citizens’
choice, through state guarantee of the protection of both their social and political rights
(Sen 1999). Consequently democratic developmental states seek to incorporate these
inherent and vital elements of citizenship that guarantee the provision of the totality of
such rights.
Seen as such, the concept of the democratic developmental state proves to be grounded
in a rights-based approach to development. It connotes a powerful narrative in which the
political elements of citizens’ individual rights are broadened and appended to the
discourse of development, thus effectively making the state’s provision of development
for citizens an obligation and for citizens a right. What emerges from this narrative is an
apparent Hobbesian contractual relation of rights and obligations between state and
society that is framed by the notion of citizenship. For states to see themselves as
democratically developmental in outlook, they have to perceive themselves to have
successfully consolidated a balance between democracy and development in their
polities. This could be ascertained by among other indices, effective institutional
structures that revitalize the society and public services which provide the dynamism for
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an inclusive society and pay serious attention to maintaining democracy. Such
institutions engage communities and citizens by proving themselves as upholding the
values of accountability, equity and inclusiveness; such that the state is seen as
trustworthy (see Forje 2006a). Both democracy and development are here conceived in
a synergic manner as well as understood broadly, the former as participatory and the
latter as redistributive and inclusive, supporting themselves mutually (cf. Robinson &
White 2005: 5).
These conceptual linkages between democracy and development are what inform
Edigheji’s (2005: 6) contention that in concrete terms, the democratic developmental
combines the features of liberal democracy (citizenship participation in the choice of
political leaders through regular free and fair elections, equality, accountability,
transparency, control of abuse of power, respect for human rights and rule of law,
among others) and the economic objectives of achieving increasing and sustained
economic growth which are also equitably redistributed. Under the democratic
developmental state, then, the state maintains its concern for public policy effectiveness
by the bureaucracy as under  the simple developmental state, but innovates by ensuring
that government services are increasingly perceived as commodities, which are paid for
by tax payers’ income and therefore ensures  these services are provided in a just and
equitable manner. But as White (1998: 28) contends, the democratic developmental
state might fail in meeting development aspirations if the political processes within the
state inhibit it from delivering socio-economic and political security to meet the material
needs of its citizenry, who are its clients. He further notes that it is by their having
access to these rights (services) that citizens can press for institutions that foster
transparency, equity and accountability in governance since the democratic
developmental state, as a regime, is denoted as “democratic institutionalism,”
emphatically geared towards institutional performance on policy outcomes (White
1998: 29).
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2.1.3. The Democratic Developmental State-Society Nexus: Taxation as a Critical Link
In this strand of the literature taxation is closely linked to state or institutional capacity
and in a closely related view, the capacity of a government to tax is seen as a key
indicator of a state’s ability to govern (Brautigam 1996: 81). One of the most important
functions of the state which largely determines its legitimacy is to raise revenue to
support its policies and programs. As Theda Skocpol (1985: 17) has noted:
“A state’s means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us more than could any single
factor about its existing (and immediately potential) capacities to create or strengthen state
organizations, to employ personnel, to co-opt political support, to subsidize economic enterprises,
and to fund social programmes.”
Thus, taxation produces forms of state-society relations, and these vary with the nature
of the tax involved, whether it is income, customs, or property tax (Sabates &
Schneider 2003: 7). But in sub-Saharan Africa, that pattern of state-society relations
that taxation might engender is difficult to gauge, given the hazy context in which
taxation is exercised. As van de Walle (2001: 53) observes, taxes are either “not
collected, exemptions [from taxes] are granted, tariffs are averted, licenses are bribed
away, parking fines are pocketed.”  These processes are associated with what Mbembe
(2000; 2001: 66) understands as the social practice of “fiscality”, culminating in what
he sees as the logic of “private indirect government.” This logic is expressed through
the prism of neoptrimonial patterns of governance, which will be explored more
adequately subsequently (cf. Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 63; van de Walle 2005a;
von Soest 2007).
In such a context, it becomes understandable that some Africanist observers note that
African countries expose a very weak “tax paying culture” (see Fjeldstad 2003a; 2003b;
Gloppen & Rakner 2002). Indeed, in many developing countries, especially in Africa,
the tax paying system is too often regarded as illegitimate, hence shunned and evaded
(Fjeldstad 2002: 3), thus connecting the practice of taxation to the problems of
engendering and sustaining administrative responsibility and accountability. As will be
discussed further, this perspective is quite strong in recent analyses that suggest that the
extent to which states rely on taxes may also indicate what sorts of states they are,  in
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reference to whether they very much rely on tax revenues or revenues from natural
resource exploitations (cf. Moore 1998; 2004a; 2004b; Luoga 2002; Rakner 2002). But
more fundamentally, the salience of the idea of taxation as a bond between the
governing and the governed or state and citizen, is that it resonates with the Western
liberal democratic ideology of Rousseau’s social contract. This democratic ideology
implies that by paying taxes the citizen consents to a state’s rule, for the citizen knows
that the state acts in his/her best interest. The citizen in this context is assumed to have a
greater incentive to perform his/her civic duty of paying taxes, for they are aware that it
is for the ‘public good’.
In the context of the democratic developmental state, then, the state and its bureaucracy
must take citizens’ need and interests into account because of the recognition of
‘citizens as clients,’ given the taxes they pay for these government-provided services.
These taxes entitle them to demand transparency, accountability and social justice from
the institutions of the state in the management of public wealth. Citizens’ tax
contributions are vital to the developmental function of the state, since the latter is
conditioned by the volume of revenue disposable to it. Indeed, in recent discussions on
governance in developing countries taxation has come to occupy a central place. For
example, Sabates and Schneider (2003) contend that taxation is associated to the state in
two perspectives. There is the link between taxation and state accountability on the one
hand and the relation between taxation and state capacity on the other (Sabates &
Schneider 2003: 4). Observing these relations, they wonder if citizens made to pay more
taxes demand more in return from the state.
As they contend, these questions enable an uncovering of the relationship between
taxation and accountability, given that they indicate the key issues of who actually gets
taxed and to whom the state is accountable to. With respect to state capacity, they argue
that within the literature it is increasingly established that the nature of the tax (whether
it is income tax, custom tax or property tax) generates a specific mode of state-society
relations, hence our understanding of taxation can only be appropriate when fully
grounded in the mode of politics within a state, whether it be authoritarian or
democratic. Lise Rakner (2002) has also noted the existence of a tense relation between
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public revenue collection through taxation and demands from citizens for more
democratically accountable government. But she distinguishes between internal
accountability of a tax system, as that which is focused on the taxation system itself (its
reach and efficiency in terms of collection and transparency) on the one hand, and
external accountability as that which looks at the link between governments and the
citizens, especially in a mode that is democratically accountable, on the other.
In these terms, the relationship between taxation and accountability generates two levels
at which accountability must be sought: the first, at the level of tax administration and
the second at the level of relations between state and citizens. In relation to this, Moore
(1998; 2004a; 2004b) has made a strong distinction between states which earn most of
their revenue through taxation as being qualitatively different from those that have
revenue principally from ‘unearned income’ associated with aid or ‘natural resource
boons’ such as for example oil and forestry. For him, given the imperative need for
states relying on tax revenue to function, they are bound to concede a shift towards
democratic accountability in service provision and public policy, as opposed to those
that rely on non-tax revenues, which by consequence seem to be quite intransigent in
according democratic institutionalism a chance.
In response to these distinctions, we note Sabates and Schneider’s (2003: 9) further
contention that we must look at whether democratic accountability (as a sub-type of
state-citizens accountability) requires formal institutional processes or could include
informal representation and consultation mechanisms. For them, within the relationship
between state and citizens as articulated through taxation, there are three possible modes
of relationships: anti-tax, exchange, and more-for-less. The anti-tax model is supposed
to refer to situations where individuals seek to minimize their payment of taxes, while at
the “exchange” level; individuals consider the relationship between the taxes the pay
and the services they receive from the government. The more-for-less mode of
relationship denotes a situation in which citizens simultaneously want more and better
services at lower tax rates (Sabates & Schneider 2003: 9).
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These distinctions by Sabates and Schneider have equally prompted Moore (2007) to
return to the debate, as he recently argues that the taxation-governance nexus is couched
within “two competing meta-narratives.” The first meta-narrative sees taxation as a
catalyst for “revenue bargaining” wherein tax revenues (for the state) are traded for
institutionalized influence over public policy by citizens, contributing to political
development. A second meta-narrative is that which underscores the tax–governance
relationship as framed by a “highly coercive” state-citizen relationship, wherein citizens
make subjective evaluations of the rate of taxes and the benefits or sanctions of tax
evasion. If one goes by Fjeldstad (2001: 290; 2004), Moore’s point of departure in
making these distinctions on the proportion of tax revenue as a determinant of state-
society relations lies in the fact that such bargaining over the budget and tax policy,
could be conceived as one of the primary medium of reconciling different state and
societal goals or interests
In reflection to some arguments reviewed earlier on, with respect to the possibility of
‘state capture’ by the narrow interests of a small and powerful business or other elites,
notably under a simple ‘developmental state’, Sabates and Schneider further warn that it
is important to examine the mode and direction of a state’s accountability. For them, it
is important to determine if the state is merely accountable to powerful economic
interests or tax payers associations or whether the state and its tax administration
institutions are made accountable to the poor (Sabates & Schneider 2003.) These issues,
it should be recalled, are integral to the ability of the state to expand legitimacy in view
of gaining popular consensus from most of those citizens paying taxes. For example,
Luoga (2002) has shown that there is a need to effectively ground reforms in tax
administration within codified institutional laws, if democratic principles are to be
sustained, given that these laws (norms and principles) and legal structures are
important in shaping democratic values in tax administration, such as equal taxation of
equal earnings, ability to pay and rights to redress in cases of tax abuses. The contention
is that sustaining such a legal structure supports a state’s quest for legitimacy for tax
collection in the opinion of tax paying citizens.
27
2.1.4. Taxation and Democratic Values: Accountability, Transparency and
Responsibility
I consider these three values of accountability, transparency and responsibility as
‘supply factors’, which influence citizens’ perceptions of taxation of any sort. Basically,
Gregory and Hicks (1999: 7, cited in Salminen 2006: 175) indicate that accountability
and responsibility, while being complementary are different, the first being a way of
expressing responsible governance. Nevertheless, Drewry (2002: 437, cited in Salminen
2006: 175) underlines that accountability and responsibility express inter-institutional
relationships in the public servants-politicians-legislators-the electorate nexus.
Essentially, then, accountability is pronged to the existence of a democratic spirit in a
polity, in which mechanisms for checking and scrutinizing the attitudes of various
institutional actors exists.
Taken simplistically, accountability, which is the obligation to render an account for a
responsibility that has been conferred to a specific institutional actor (political leader,
legislators, public servants or organizations), helps these actors charged with the
performance of particular actions or activities to be held responsible in terms of clearly
articulated codes of conduct. Transparency or openness implies that these institutional
actors are readily predisposed towards making data and information from public as well
as private sources that is accurate, timely, relevant and comprehensive, available and
ready for the unobstructed access by citizens, who are conceived as customers. Further,
tolerance for public debate, public scrutiny and public questioning of political,
economic and social policy choices is equally a good measure of the disposition of such
institutional actors towards democratic and accountable management. (UNDP 1998.)
The need for citizens to hold public institutional actors accountable is premised on the
basic understanding that it should never be automatically assumed that budgetary
allocations in public organizations will necessarily translate accurately into appropriate
and expected spending plans. What money actually gets spent by whom, on what items
and for what purpose, is not only determined during the process of budget allocution
and execution, but is also strongly enmeshed in political and interpersonal relations
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within the organizations themselves (Norton & Elson 2002.) Accountability is sub-
divided into three broad categories: political, administrative and financial or budgetary
accountability (UNDP 1998).
Political accountability underpins the mechanisms and processes aimed at making
political authorities answerable to the people for actions they take or fail to take in
discharging their official duties, while financial or budgetary accountability is
understood as the ability to account for the allocation, use and control of public monies
and public assets and properties from beginning to end, in accordance with legally
mandated and/or professionally accepted rules, principles and practices (UNDP 1998).
Most crucial for my task in this study, administrative accountability is conceived as the
vertical reporting relationships that inhere in classical administrative structures of
governance, usually known as the bureaucracy or the civil service. Clear definitions of
norms, rules, roles and responsibilities— the division of labor— provide yardsticks
against which to gauge administrative performance. Also, key institutions to the
successful promotion of all these forms of accountability are the constitution, the
legislative, the   citizens (as voters) and the civil society (UNDP 1998). Lederman,
Norman and Soares (2005) demonstrate that the establishment of openness and legal
tradition, by themselves do not suffice to ensure substantive accountability, as compared
to the positive impact which democratic practice and parliamentary consistence, and
freedom of the civil society press, all have in maintaining low levels of corruption, thus
supporting strong accountability.
With regards to taxation, a respectable body of work links the availability and usage of
various mechanisms for accountability (as a voice for citizens) to the general level of
tax efforts in developing countries. For instance, tax effort (the amount collected by any
state in taxes) is found to be strongly determined by the underlying force of voice as a
measure of accountability, as one of the critical demand factors “affecting institutional
quality” (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler 2007). All these insights on government
accountability and responsibility underscore the fact that the reading of the tax system
made by citizens is strongly tied to their collective learning of government and
institutional practices. This, in turn, shapes their perceptions of and trust in the quality
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of governance. It is therefore justified to examine the conceptual basis of citizens’
collective learning processes, through the concept of a collective or social memory, and
assess its conceptual link to the shaping of citizens’ perceptions of the state and its
administrative institutions.
2.2. Collective Memory: Historicizing Collective Perceptions of Trust/ Distrust in
Institutions
In recent time, scholarly work on institutionalism has had to take on various disciplinary
perspectives, aimed at broadening the scope of its look at the shifting and changing
meaning of institutions in people’s lives, across time and cultures. Some of the work on
(democratic developmental) institutionalism by the ‘sociological school’ adopts a
holistic approach at not only the institutions as its prime object of gaze, but also
incorporates how historical trajectories structure and condition present collective
behavior in organizational contexts (cf. Lane & Ersson 2000: 12). In fact Lane and
Ersson (ibid.) do mention that such histories shape memories and these memories
constitute an integral aspect for analysis in the holistic perspective of sociological
institutionalism, considering their place in explaining the behavior of actors within the
institutions.
Also, it was noted in the preceding section that while the democratic developmental
state aims at maintaining democratic accountability within its institutions in order to
secure greater legitimacy, such efforts depend very much on the extent to which citizens
evaluate the state and its institutions as credible or trustworthy. However, when we
mention credibility or trust, we note that these are very much products of ‘time’, given
that it takes quite a period of time for citizens to develop such evaluations. And, if we
acknowledge institutional duration as a strong component of institutional analysis, then
we are equally according the recognition that institutions are cultural products. It is
therefore understandable to agree with Sabates and Schneider (2003: 15?17) that not
only do we need a clear understanding of the way cultural legacy define government
legitimacy, but also must we acknowledge that such institutional legacies develop over
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long periods. Thus, credibility or trust is a product of ‘memory’, but in this context it is
a product of ‘shared memory’ of the majority of citizens, on the extent to which they see
their institutions as accountable and reliable. Trust or credibility, seen as such, can
better be understood within the context of a memory that is collective. This sub-section
will, in the first instance, proceed to highlight the constitutive elements of collective
memory, and then draw attention to how processes flowing from the interactions within
public institutions condition its relationship to the vital elements of trust or credibility.
Even if somewhat evident, the sub-section will also briefly highlight how actors (tax
paying citizens) could ground their perceptions of state legitimacy and eventual
compliance conformity or non-compliance to the culture of tax payment.
2.2.1. Collective Memory: Conceptual Definition and Constitutive Elements
Building upon the work of his French compatriot (Emile Durkheim’s) notion of
collective conscience, the term ‘collective memory’ was first introduced by Maurice
Halbwachs in 1925, principally, to refer to the strong influence of social processes in
shaping a community's shared memories of the past (Kohli-Kunz 1973: 39–42, cited in
Holtorf 2007). The point of relevance was to note that such collective memories are
crucial for the constitution of the identity of these communities (Halbwachs 1992, cited
in Pennebraker & Banasik 1997a) and such memories were different from individual
memories, even if this difference was not too distinct. Today, many scholars concur that
collective memory of the past is not only influenced but constituted by social contexts
of the present (cf. for examples, Middleton & Edwards 1990; Fentress & Wickham
1992). Also, it is this perspective that informs Halbwachs’ (1992, cited in Pennebraker
& Banasik 1997a) view that such collective memory is different from ‘history’ and this
distinction stems from the fact that collective memory is couched within “social layers”
while history is a product of the items in individual accounts that are “archived.”
In effect, to Assman (1995: 131, cited in Bennich-Björkman 2005: 7), since Halbwachs
equates collective memory to oral communication of past events, the view that any other
item could be a site of collective memory is jettisoned. Pennebraker and Banasik
(1997a)  note  that  this  view,  that  the  basic  media  or  site  of  collective  memory  was
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language or oral tradition was very strongly shared by soviet theorists working around
the same time, as for examples, Lev Vigotsky and V.N.Voloshinov. And some
contemporary discussion still hinges on this linguistic imperative for collective memory
to exists, as for example David Bakhurst (1990: 219), who in reference to Voloshinov,
echoes that:
“To remember is always to give a reading of the past, a reading which requires linguistic skills
derived from the traditions of explanation and story-telling within a culture and which [presents]
issues in a narrative that owes its meaning ultimately to the interpretative practices of a
community of speakers. This is true even when what is remembered is one's own past experience...
[The] mental image of the past ... becomes a phenomenon of consciousness only when clothed with
words, and these owe their meaning to social practices of communication”.
This position therefore holds that once these “traditions” are materialized into books
(writings), buildings and monuments, memories are considered transformed into facts
for the archive- “history” (cf. Bennich-Björkman 2005: 7).
However, it must be pointed out that scholars today, while agreeing with the basic idea
of collective memory  as a collective  product, question the validity and even possibility
of empirically detaching them from individual memories, since events or processes
impact upon both (see Thelen 1989: 1125;  Fentress & Wickham 1992: xi). Both are
said to reflect first and foremost the conditions of the present in which they originate
(Geary 1994: 10?12, 19?20). Also, today it is valid to acknowledge that memory
resides in several other “sites” as for example, monuments and other artifacts, upon
which people create a past through active remembrances within the social context in
which they live. Such memories could assume an important role in defining both
personal and collective identities (Radley 1990; Tjebbe 1998). However, much more
relevant is the instrumentalist nature with which different groups relate to and use such
collective identities generated from collective memory. It is common that social
memory is used as a symbolic resource to enact strategic political and social discourses
that lend support to their opinions and actions (Baker 1985).
Yet, also, it is understood that socially deeply penetrating events derive much of the
potential power by inciting strong emotional feelings, which in turn provoke the actors
who have these emotional experiences to unavoidably discuss or share them. Thus, it
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seems that the more intense these personal emotions are, the more likely they tend to be
diffused by discussing or sharing them. And within this context, just as Pennebaker and
Banasik (1997a: ix; 1997b: 6) note that political unrest could cause intense feelings of
anxiety if these are a cumulative set of small shocks, so too must one understand that
any continuous series of threatening social or economic events/shocks could provoke
feelings of distress and anxiety over the uncertainties of livelihood in the future. As
such, critical to the understanding of collective memory is the long term impact of such
abrupt single or short-lived but related cumulative events, in having institutional and or
personal impact on the lives of a community and its members, for it to be validly seen as
collective memory. These events could have personal impact, but will not be collective
memory without their triggering institutional implications (Pennebaker & Banasik
1997b: 6).
It is Jenny Edkins (2003: 4) who has recently noted in clear terms that the trauma
induced by such shocks on people, could also involve a betrayal, when she incisively
writes that:
“Trauma also has to involve a betrayal of trust… what we call trauma takes place when the very
powers that we are convinced will protect us and give us security become our tormentors: when
the community of which we considered ourselves members turns against us or when our family is
no longer a site of refuge.”
Such erosion of trust in leaders, institutions or family provoke a strong sense of
insecurity in the people involved, as they see a need to be suspicious of any actions that
these may direct in their regard. In short, in the words of Edkins (2003: 5), the erosion
of trust “reveal the contingency of the social order”, for in disrupting our understanding
of community, trauma diminishes their communicative abilities about events and
relations with those in whom they have lost trust in. This, then, seems to indicate a
strong place for the notion of trust, as a product of collective memory. It also suggests
the vital role which trust occupies in terms of institutional analysis, relations which are
made explicit in the next sub-section below.
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2.2.2. Collective Memories of Trust and Citizens’ relations to Public Institutions
Bennich-Björkman (2005: 8) has observed that scholars working within rational-choice
models do consider the mechanism by which collective memories work, as yet another
basis for decision-making gambling. And these mechanisms shape actors’ perceptions
of ‘self’ and ‘otherness’, in terms of “who we are”, “who we were”, “how we do things
in this community” (cf. Assman 1995: 132?133, cited in Bennich-Björkman 2005: 8),
thus lending support to value patterns and behavior both beneficial and non-beneficial
for society as a whole. This makes collective memories of identities as potentially
possessing prospect for social capital, which enhances community bonds, but Bennich-
Björkman (ibid.) cautions that nothing guarantees that identities necessarily possess
such ‘enhancing’ undertones.
Understandably, it will mean that only certain specific type of such identities are
socially productive, those that enhance values of community and belonging, those
which make communities dependable, in the opinion of its members. Thus, it is only
identities that inspire trust that hold potential for social capital (cf. Putnam 1993; 1995;
2000). Indeed, as Uslaner (2004; 2006) contends, bonds of trust  enable greater
confidence in other people’s promises to  cooperate, what is described by Yamigishi and
Yamigishi (1994, cited in Uslaner 2004) as “knowledge-based trust,” in reference to the
experiential and informational character of trust. And Offe (1999: 56, cited in Uslaner
2004) underscores this even further by his casual note that “trust in persons results from
past experience with concrete persons.” All of these highlight the strategic, rather than
moral nature of trust, as we oft think of it, leading Hardin to further note such strategic
nature a “trustworthiness”(Hardin 2002: 55?56, cited in Uslaner 2004), which indicates
a game-theory concept of “preference,” wherein the trustee weighs his options towards
the other actors, if they are trustworthy for entrusting with reciprocating or distrustful,
to be met with suspicion, avoidance or exploitation (cf. Ahn 2002: 7). Vital for
consideration here, are among others, three questions which Uslaner (2004) notes, often
come to actors’ mind: “Do others act in a way that warrants your trust? Are they honest
and straightforward? Do they keep their promises?”
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Thus far, we note that if we have to shift the concept of trust into the context of public
policy and public institutional analysis, we would be acknowledging their grounding
within the cognitive processes of public assessment of the public administrative
apparatus and practices (in terms of trustworthiness). For example, Rothstein (2001b)
has pointed out that “corruption thus had two cognitive dimensions, one influencing
beliefs about “other people”, the other influencing beliefs about government
institutions.”As such, Rose-Ackerman (2001: 11) notes that such trust will be “rule-
base trust”, as an index of the extent to which, people trust organizations/institutions to
keep their commitment to clearly stated rules, procedures and impartiality, all of which
constitute quintessential attributes of bureaucratic organizations, as outlined by Max
Weber. But Rose-Ackerman (2001: 13) notes further, that, while both generalized trust
in society and trust in public institutions is a key ingredient for the civic participation of
citizens in politics and other aspects of public life, these will depend on the rule-based
character of the state, its credibility or trustworthiness. Government institutions can only
create and sustain such trustworthiness by their building a reputation which shows them
as having capacities to and do monitor conformity to laws, while sanctioning those who
infringe these laws; for, compliance to such laws depends on citizens’ understanding
that such laws are enforced with equality, as well as on their knowledge that others also
respect these laws (Levi 1998, cited in Rose- Ackerman 2001).
2.3. Synthesis: Collective Memory, Citizens’ Trust and Taxation in a Democratically
Developmental State
This review has shown that besides the concern with political regime type, there is a
strong need for building trust between citizens and the state, for both of these underpin
the revenue generating capacity of the state, especially the developmentally out-looking
state (Sindzingre 2006: 9?10). Yet, in the context of the democratic developmental
state, this review has shown that generating such trust in citizens by public institutions
is contingent upon the latter’s improvement of institutional performance to meet the
needs and aspirations of the former, such that citizens perceive that government
institutions are accessible, socially just and inclusive and very much accountable in the
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management of public revenue. Accountability, in turn, was noted as involving not only
justification of decisions and actions, and managerial answerability for implementation
of agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance by civil servants (Day &
Klein 1987, cited in Therkildsen 2001: 2), but also a strong responsibility on the part of
the political elite in the outcomes of public institutions, vis-a-vis the citizens. It is only
in these terms that the state could secure and enhance its legitimacy in the opinion of the
citizens.
But it has also been made evident that the state-citizens’ relations is a product of
interactions between them, which over a considerable period of time enable citizens to
develop a shared sense of memory about the impact of major events or processes, either
flowing directly from such state institutions or elsewhere, with the impact of such
memory generally transforming social and political institutions. Contextually, as well,
these memories prove important in the formation of individual identities, as well as
enabling their instrumental enactment into social and political discourses of various
sections or groups within the political community, to contest or articulate political,
economic or cultural interests. Thus, it opens up the possibility that citizens’ memories
of the nature of the performance of public institutions in terms of their efficiency, equity
and accountability shapes and conditions their cognitive evaluations of the latter’s
trustworthiness, whether these are to be trusted or distrusted. This is what Zucker (1986)
captures as “processed-based trust”, akin to rule-based trust encountered earlier on. It is
upon these cognitive evaluations that citizens often premise their collective behavior,
for example, taxation-related behavior, an element of economic behavior that is of
particular concern to us here. The latter can become a site upon which such
contestations between the state and citizens could be played out.
Indeed, the perceptions of citizens, as to a judicious and accountable use of tax revenue
by the state for social service provision is an incentive in building citizens’ trust in
government, as well as further motivate them towards cooperative attitudes in the
payment of taxes (cf. Rothstein 2001a). Likewise, if over a long period of time citizens
internalize processes of corruption, misappropriations, and worse, register a long history
impunity for those who commit these crimes within the institutions and structures
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legally responsible to do so (courts, police, etc.), citizens develop and perceive a sense
of betrayal of trust. It becomes plausible that they to turn adopt distrusting and
suspicious opinion of government activities, and could view taxation as illegitimate,
especially if the burden of such taxation is not met by a feeling of reciprocated
provision of social and other public goods on the part of government.
In light of the above theoretical and analytical synthesis, the next chapter, in reviewing
the empirical literature on the relations between state building and development, as well
as the relations between such modes of governance and the crucial notions of trust,
accountability and responsibility, an effort will be made to link the current empirical
findings to the underlying assumptions of the democratic developmental state model
and the potency of democratic institutionalism in building citizen trust. This could entail
interrogating the soundness of this very theory of democratic developmentalism, even if
only to expose and recognize both the possibilities and limits of the model in making
explicit the intricacies associated with the challenges of state building, democracy and
economic development. This even more so especially in today’s context where the
external environment plays a crucial role in dictating the options available for various
states seeking possible ways to cope with demands for liberalization and the need for
effective state control of public institutions.
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3. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
3.1. Introduction
This chapter makes a review of empirical findings surrounding the dominant themes in
this study and their relationships. The chapter begins by exploring empirical evidence
on the role of fiscal revenue in state capacity in relation to other sources of revenue,
especially resources from aid, as a reflection of the relative weight of the domestic and
global resource environments in the context of African governance.  The chapter then
reviews evidence that suggests the critical elements that shape citizens’ perception of
taxation and outlines these as the desire for accountability and responsibility in
administration, both crucial in building and maintaining their trust in public institutions
within a state. It therefore pays special attention to evidence surrounding this crucial
need for citizens’ trust in the tax system by exploring further concerns for fairness,
equity, service delivery and the damaging impact of corruption in undermining the need
for accountability in institutional efforts to build and sustain citizens’ trust. Finally the
chapter  explores  the  nature  of  citizens’ perceptions  and how they are  often  manifested,  in
empirical cases within available literature.
3.2 . African States and their Efforts at Resource Mobilization: Linkages to State
Capacity
Overall, due to low levels of income, demographic factors, and the structure of financial
markets, which are generally hard to control under short and medium terms, most
African countries have very low levels of domestic resource mobilization, as compared
to countries in the OECD or Asian contexts (UNTACD 2007: 6; cf. Tanzi & Zee 2000).
As a result, increasing domestic resource mobilization has become a necessity if African
states are to survive the growing uncertainties inherent in an incessantly wobbling
global environment. As could be recalled from the previous short review of Africa’s
development history in the early part of chapter two (section 2.2.), African economies
have increasingly turned to rely on the global financial and development institutions,
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such as the IMF, World Bank and even the World Trade Organization, all of which
often impose policy choices on African governments. This has made some, such as the
leading African economist and current director of the United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development, Thandika Mkandawire (1999), to describe them as “choiceless
democracies.”
In return, African governments increasingly rely on external resource flows such as
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) from bilateral and multilateral cooperation
agreements with either these institutions or western partner countries, as a major source
of revenue for their yearly financing of development and other state-led programs.
Added to the ODA, African countries increasingly rely on flows of investment funds
from foreign direct investment (FDI) by major global economic actors such as
multinational corporations. Their competition for these funds has become increasingly
stronger, as all seek to offer better conditions that could attract more foreign firms to
invest in their countries (see for example, Orock 2006: 254).
But are these external resource flows sustainable as to be helpful in enabling the
strengthening of the capacities of African states to confront the multiple development
and other public policy challenges facing them, such as the reduction of unemployment?
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD (2007: 6) has
argued that while ODA remains a major source of finance in the region, it is volatile,
heavily concentrated and dependent on the priorities (often geopolitical or strategic,
including security considerations) of development partners (see also Orock 2006:
254?5). Even FDI, which has attracted a lot of attention recently, though more highly
concentrated in Africa than is ODA, is equally noted to be also relatively volatile and
tends to focus on extractive industries with very few linkages to the domestic economy
(UNCTAD 2000; Orock 2006).
These observations about the role of the external or global environment points to the
fact that strengthening domestic resource mobilization offers many potential benefits to
African economies, as argued by UNCTAD (2007: 6?7). Firstly, because it will reduce
the dependency on external flows, thereby reducing one of the sources of damaging
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volatility in resource availability, and reduce vulnerability to external shocks from
changes in the increasingly volatile global economic environment. Secondly, it will give
African countries greater policy space, increasing their ownership of the development
process as well as strengthening their state capacity. Moreover, in order to summarize
the detrimental impact of the global economic environment on the domestic efforts at
building capacity, we must recall as was noted in the review of theoretical insights, that
states whose governments rely too much on external resource flows as those that rely
too much on natural resource exploitation in their countries, do not pay very much
attention to the quality of their governance or performance, as they are guaranteed of
future resources.
In the African case for example, van de Walle (2001; 2005a) argues that since Western
donor partners had focused too much on providing development assistance to African
governments, the latter fed on these funds not only to obstruct the very Structural
Adjustment Program pushed forward by the donor and lending communities, but they
also used these funds to ‘feed’ their clientelist networks that help sustain their
authoritarian stay in power (see also van de Walle 2007). And in reaction to this
insufficient attention by aid agencies towards the political incentives facing recipient
governments, Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle (2008: 14) suggests that:
“Large aid flows can result in a reduction in governmental accountability because governing elites
no longer need to ensure the support of their publics and the assent of their legislatures when they
do not need to raise revenues from the local economy, as long as they keep the donors happy and
willing to provide alternative sources of funding.”
This observation confirms earlier empirical findings from Knack (2001) and Djankov,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2006) showing that aid worsens democracy, bureaucratic
quality, the rule of law, and corruption. Thus, essentially, external resource flows helped
consolidate non-democratic and non-accountable governments in Africa. The
implication of these observations on the impact of reliance on external resource flows
for African efforts at building state-capacity, is that these states must devote greater
attention to domestic sources of resource mobilization. And taxation, as a means of
raising public revenue for state expenditure is one of the easiest means to do so.
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Indeed, many are those African states whose domestic resource mobilization is largely
derived from taxation, as is the case for Cameroon. Taxes account for non-substantial
levels in government revenue in most African countries, about 22 per cent (World Bank
2005, cited in UNCTAD 2007: 16). As the UNCTAD (2007: 16) report argue further,
without distorting private economic capacities, widening the tax-base can potentially
enhance domestic resource mobilization in African states. This picture is not meant as a
blanket grouping of all African states in the same bracket of fiscal capacity in domestic
resource mobilization.
Rather, it is just meant to indicate that the tax ratio, given as the ratio of tax revenues to
gross domestic product in an economy, is considerably lower in sub-Saharan Africa (20
per cent), than for example  North Africa (25 per cent), and in excluding South Africa,
the ratio for sub-Saharan Africa drops to  only 16 per cent. Moreover, there are
important differences between countries in the region with regard to their tax
performance (World Bank 2005, cited in UNCTAD 2007: 17). Stotsky and
WoldeMariam (1997) have found per capita income levels, trade levels, and the shares
of agriculture and mining in the economy to be very significant in determining the tax
ratio for sub-Saharan Africa (cf. UNCTAD 2007: 17).
Also, following work carried out by Piancastelli (2001) on cross-national comparison of
“tax efforts” (the percentage of tax in proportion to real  per capita income) UNCTAD
(2007: 17) notes that despite low tax-to-GDP ratios noted earlier, tax effort is higher in
Africa than in other regions,. This would suggest that the tax rates achieved in Africa,
while low, are higher than expected given the structure and development levels of
African economies. However, it should be observed that owing to the subjectivities
accompanying such measures, arising mainly from the models used, and such measures
on tax efforts should be interpreted cautiously. Measures of tax effort are strongly
dependent on the model used, and have been found to be too often determined much
more by  political power and influence (coercion), given that these states are also noted
to have low taxable capacity that is costly to collect, especially in rural areas (cf. Rakner
& Gloppen 2003; Fjeldstad 2006b). In Uganda, for example, only middle-size firms
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tend to pay taxes. Large firms can use their influence and relations within the state to
evade taxes and small firms can dodge taxes by staying in the informal sector (cf.
Gauthier & Reinikka 2006).
State legitimacy, is ultimately, at the heart of taxation. Applying criteria of efficiency,
effectiveness and fairness not only to the tax system but also to the use of government
resources can create a virtuous cycle of improving fiscal performance, service delivery
and state legitimacy. For example, recent research in Tanzania and Uganda reveals that
a large majority is willing to pay more taxes if the resources visibly improve public
services (Fjeldstad 2006a; 2006b; Fjeldstad et al. 2006). In this optic, taxation in
Tazania and other African countries provides one of the principal lenses in measuring
state capacity and power distribution, and emerges as an important measure to the
viability and effectiveness of the state (cf. Toye 2000).
Thus, the productivity of the tax system in improving domestic resource mobilization, is
unlikely to be great in the absence of more profound changes in state–society relations,
towards a more transparent and if not participatory, at least accountable process of
public governance. But specifically, what factors or ideas surround the opinions and
perceptions which tax payers have and motivate them to pay, or at least to induce them
to see government actions in taxing them as worthwhile? The next section surveys some
empirical evidence towards highlighting these.
3.3. Citizens’ Perceptions of Taxation: What Counts across the Board?
In the review of theoretical positions in the previous chapter, the dominant view that
links taxation to broad expectations associated with the ‘democratic imagination,’
comes from the abundant literature on the ‘resource curse.’ We noted that essentially
this conceptual insight argues that in mineral abundant economies, where states gain a
large portion of their revenues from rents on minerals such as oil and diamonds, the
reduced necessity of state decision-makers to levy heavy domestic taxes causes leaders
not only to be less accountable to individuals and groups within civil society; more
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prone to engage in and accommodate rent-seeking and corruption, as well as makes
them both less willing and less able  to formulate growth-enhancing policies (Mahdavy
1970, emphasis added; see also Karl 1997).
In arguing their case, it should be noted that the proponents of the literature on the
resource curse do not have sufficient evidence to explain differential growth
performance among oil states, and changes in growth rates in particular oil states over
time (Di John 2004). However, they have successfully drawn attention to an important
fact about the relations between taxation, democracy and state-formation, relations
which Charles Tilly had since and steadfastly pointed out in the context of European
states.  This relations rests on the claim that  the type of taxes (and not just  the level of
taxes) and the manner in which the state appropriates resources is central to
understanding the historical development of state capacity (Tilly 1985; 1990). The
critical elements in taxation as highlighted by this theoretical position are the
expectations for accountability, the need to check and minimize the opportunities for
rent-seeking by tax administrative agents through collusive networks of corruption. The
last two point to citizens’ fear of the tax system becoming unequal, hence unjust, where
some will pay more while others pay less or nothing at all.
Within the context of contemporary empirical work on critical issues surrounding
concerns with taxation, Mick Moore (1998; 2004a; 2004b) has persuasively argued and
shown, with specific reference to South Africa and some Latin American countries, that
in fact those states earning more of their revenue through what he describes as ‘natural
resource boons’ and foreign aid are qualitatively less accountable and less democratic
than those which rely more extensively on tax revenues. However, there is evidence that
is somewhat unsupportive of this claim by Moore. In their review of a four year
research project on taxation in three African countries (Uganda, Tanzania and Namibia,
all countries with minimal natural resources), Fjeldstad and  Therkildsen (2004: 1)
found that the level of fiscal revenue mobilization in these states turned out to be
determined more by conflict and coercion, as well as methods of tax collection, rather
than politically negotiated understandings such as the attention to the quantity  and
quality of services in exchange of taxes, in a in a democratic spirit. In addition to these,
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they found the activities of tax administration to be saddled with administrative
problems of political interference in the implementation of tax policies. Most
importantly, they noted that central government taxes in these countries affect only
relatively few people directly (an estimate of less than 5 percent of the total population),
as compared to local government taxation which affects many more about 30 percent,
largely men. (Fjeldstad & Therkildsen 2004: 1; see also Fjeldstad 2001.) With respect to
such local government taxation, focusing on market dues as a type of tax collected by
local governments in Rwanda and Uganda, Magala and Rubagumya (2007) found that
the failure of local governments to deliver quality services de-motivates tax payers from
paying such dues.
Taken together, then, these findings suggests that for most African countries,
irrespective of whether they rely heavily on tax revenues or not, they are unlikely to be
democratic and treat tax payers with fairness and dignity; there is a strong absence of
possibilities for reciprocal exchange of taxes for efficient service delivery and
accountability between citizens and their governments. This seems to be so because the
means of ‘revenue bargaining’ are foreclosed by the strong coercion exercised on the
populations in these countries.
Yet, in a cross-cultural and trans-continental comparative perspective, others have noted
that even though tax administrative agencies are generally seen as coercive institutions
by nature, there is increasing adoption of what has been termed ‘customer-friendliness’
in countries such as Norway and other Nordic countries. It is argued that even though
national cultures here are supposedly pre-disposed to the normalization of the coercive
nature  of  their  tax  systems  (Aberbach  &  Christensen  2007).  Both  the  extractive   and
service-providing institutions of the state increasingly adopt a ‘friendly’ approach in
dealing with citizens and foreign workers even as they adopt a bargaining approach, in
terms of working under transparent rules of tax collections and a high accountability in
the use of revenues for the provision of public goods . For examples, Aberbach and
Christensen (2007) discuss their findings on these ideas about ‘customer friendliness
and taxation in Norway, while Salminen (2006: 173) notes the incorporation of such
customer-friendliness in the case of New Public Management Reforms that have
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characterized Finland in recent decades (cf. also Christensen 2003, for a description of
Nordic national cultures and their relations to taxation and governance in general). This
change of attitude in tax administration emerging in these countries suggests either a
more general consumer orientation, meaning more openness, information and
interaction, or a greater focus on peoples’ individual rights, not only towards the way
they pay taxes but also to benefit from the taxes they pay.
All these values underpin democratic and administrative accountability as an utmost
resource for tax systems. In further empirical support of the unproductive consequences
of the absences of ‘revenue bargaining’ and ‘reciprocity’ in African countries, Smith
(1992: 227) argues that tax authorities’ unresponsive, corrupt and unfair treatment of tax
payers foster disrespect for and resistance against tax authorities and tax laws, while
Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) found that the unresponsive manner in which tax laws are
enforced and taxes are collected both fuel tax resistance in Tanzania. Feljstad (2004)
also argues that such unresponsive and coercive processes in taxation in Tanzania have
gone a long way to undermine citizens’ trust in tax administration and thus, fanned their
resistance to the tax administrators, as they had earlier found with Semboja.
Thus far, we have highlighted two sets of crucial empirical relationships existing, with
regards to states and taxation. Firstly, there is a strong link between taxation on the one
hand, and democratic values of accountability, transparency and fair treatment of
citizens (responsibility), on the other.  Secondly, we have equally noted the relationship
between taxation, on the one hand and public service delivery, corruption and trust on
the other. Both of these sets of empirical relationships need further empirical clarity. To
this end, using a certain number of indices measuring governance and institutional
quality, drawn from an international country panel and also within country data from
Switzerland that measure governance and institutional quality, Torgler and Schneider
(2007) find that there is strong support to the thesis that improved quality of governance
in terms of fairness and accountability not only increases the tax morale (the willingness
of people to pay taxes), it also  reduces their desire for tax evasion (see also Torgler &
Schneider, 2009).
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3.4. Citizens’ Trust in Taxation: Desire for Fairness, Equality, Service Delivery and
Accountability versus Corruption
Trust has emerged as central to the practices and ideas that citizens enact vis-a-vis the
state, especially with respect to its disciplinary and economic regulatory institutions.
Empirically, then, what have been some of the identified sources of trust or distrust in
government institutions? Specifically, how have certain  practices from public
administrators or agents concerned with taxation  or general state revenue
administration shaped a context for perceptions of public institutions (be it at local or
national levels)  as trustworthy or untrustworthy with respect to taxation, and by so
doing helped in shaping citizens’ disposition to comply or oppose fiscal demands from
governments?
In a broad perspective, with respect to public governance, Margeret Levi (1998) draws
from her work in Australia to argue that instituting democratic values of fair procedures
in all transactions within public institutions, and ensuring credible commitment both
contribute to governmental systems, building trustworthiness for them. She concludes
that this helps a government to secure citizens’ compliance to its demands while
government reciprocates citizens’ needs and demands for goods, services and
accountability (Levi 1998: 6?8). In the same volume, Martin Daunton (1998) draws
from the historical experience of Britain to show that British politicians successfully
expanded the extractive capacities of the state to finance the British Welfare state, by
establishing institutions and rules that assured citizens, of the limits to which the state
was empowered to extract from them. The implication was that citizens could draw
from established legislation to hold the state or its institutions for unfair treatment or
other injustice, hence justifying the trustworthiness that eventually flowed from citizens
into public institutions in Britain. Other studies attempt, rather, to account for the
decline of trust in governments, especially in the preceding decades. For example,
within efforts to explain distrust in government in the United States of America, many
have noted that it could either be attributed to the performance of elected officials
(Citrin 1974; Citrin & Green 1986) or that  of administrative leaders (Mitchell  & Scott
1987). Others still, point to a generalized citizen’s dissatisfaction with or public
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perception of incompetence from governmental institutions in the United States (Miller
1974; Williams 1985).
The results discussed so far establish citizens’ perceptions of performance in service
delivery (quantitatively and qualitatively) by public institutions, as crucial in the
building, maintaining or eroding of citizen’s trust in a state and its institutions.
Realization of this led Askvik and Jamil (2007), for example, to note that citizens’
distrust in public institutions in Bangladesh is largely a result ‘of a gap between citizen's
expectation and government's actual performance.’ This ended up eroding ‘public
confidence’ in public institutions, and further inhibited the chances of citizens enjoying
the social citizenship rights that public services bear a mandate to provide. Even more
fundamental, they found that citizen’s distrust in public institutions in Bangladesh made
them “less inclined to obey the law, pay taxes and comply in general.” (Askvik & Jamil
2007.)
Quite important, these observations bring us into the threshold of citizens’ perceptions
of the quantity and quality of goods and services supplied them by public institutions
and taxes supporting them (the price that the state compels them to pay). This resonates
with earlier observations from the African examples in Rwanda and Uganda, where
citizens’ perceptions of inadequate delivery of quality services from the local
governments in question induced their unwillingness to pay such dues (Magala &
Rubagumya 2007). Similarly, Fjelstad (2004) reports that in assessing local government
taxation in Tanzania, only 9% percent of respondents agreed that most of the revenues
collected in the area were used to provide services, while the rest “saw few tangible
benefits in return for the taxes they paid.”
This evidence from a local government supports Torgler and Schneider’s (2007)
findings mentioned earlier, that citizens’ perception that their interests (preferences) are
properly represented in political and daily administrative institutions (quality of
governance) and  that they receive an adequate supply of public goods, triggers their
identification with public policies and practices related to taxation. Essentially, then,
motivation to pay taxes, just as predisposition to non-compliance, has been found to be
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strongly related to citizens’ perceptions of a state’s fairness in taxing all according to
their capacity to pay, and visible accountability in providing services efficiently for their
benefits, which all contribute to building or eroding citizens’ trust in the state and or its
institutions (see Braithwaite 2003a; Rawlings 2003).
The implication of these analyses and evidences for taxation is that citizens’ ideas about
the way taxes are collected and used are primarily shaped by their interactions with
public officials or agents and public institutions. Thus, citizens are generally aware of
the extent to which their institutions and systems of governance and public
administrators are moral or amoral, trustworthy or untrustworthy. And citizens’
perceptions of amoral states, institutions and or administrators are largely a product of
their negative experiences and encounters with them in the past, hence the idea of
citizens’ collective learning. The perceptions which citizens build or nurse of their
governmental and or institutional quality and administrators, whether they are
trustworthy or not, is therefore a result of their memory of either their own past
transactions with these institutions  and administrators and or accounts of the
experiences of others. Citizens’ experiences with governments, institutions, or
administrators largely perceived as corrupt result in their distrust of them and this
influences their perception of taxation as largely illegitimate and or a form of
governmental nuisance.
Empirically, Valerie Braithwaite (2003a), for example, finds in the case of Australia,
that perceptions about income inequality as well as citizens’ perceptions of insufficient
procedural justice from the Australian Tax Authority, both contribute to citizens’
disillusionment with Australian democracy and government in general. This explains
her general view (Braithwaite 2003a: 335) that tax authorities, as:
“Brokers for social order and harmony, even if they cannot determine the policies that are
supposed to deliver these goals, nor the rules by which individuals are expected to contribute to
the government coffers… carry responsibility for making it all happen – collecting taxes and
providing government with revenue. As such, their integrity is pivotal to smooth democratic
functioning.”
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Considering this view, then, contemporary scholars concerned with taxation and
citizens’ compliance to pay or efforts to evade these taxes, have  increasingly argued
that citizens’ perceptions of the productivity of taxes paid and fairness in
implementation (both as indices of the quality of governance), are vital in shaping
citizens’ behavior and ideas about their obligations to the state.
This is contrary to the standard rational choice economic model of taxpayer behavior,
where  it  is  argued  that  apart  from  fear  of  punishment,  citizens’  perceptions  of  the
quality of goods and services supplied by government and the manner of implementing
government action (quality of government) are inconsequential to the overall outcome
in tax effort (cf. Allingham & Sandmo 1972, cited in Fjelstad & Semboja 2001: 2).
These views about the role of quality of governance in creating trust in  public
institutions that nurture citizens’ compliance to paying taxes have found empirical
support in recent  survey research  in Australia by Kristina Murphy (2004: 197), where
her findings show that  alongside “age,”  and “outcome favorability,” “trust” is also
significant for predicting  taxpayer “resistance” (see also Cherney 1997 and Braithwaite
& Makkai 1994, for further insights into the Australian contexts and debates; and Bird,
Martinez-Vazquez, Torgler 2007, for similar empirical findings in developing
countries).
Taking the point of institutions and administrators as builders of trust in government, as
argued by Braithwaite (2003b), institutional and administrative practices exposing
malpractice or illegality and injustice, stand out clearly as detrimental to building or
maintaining such trust. Within the public sector, administrative practices such as
corruption have been recognized as considerably prominent in eroding citizens’ trust
and ideas about accountability and responsibility in governments. In general,
administrative corruption, and more particularly corruption and misappropriations in the
sectors concerned with the management of public finance or other resources, are very
visible to citizens in their daily interaction with these institutions and administrators.
However, it has been pointed out that the level of corruption in public financial
management sectors is most often parallel to the level of corruption in the overall public
administrative environment of a state (Puhorit 2007: 288). In several ways these
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practices constitute the threads on which citizens’ images of governments’ image and
trustworthiness are constructed. As Puhorit (2007: 291) argues, “the cost of corruption
to the society (in terms of both tangible and intangible costs) is extremely
high…intangible costs include the loss of trust in democracy, in leaders, in institutions,
and in fellow citizens.” It is understandable that corruption should diminish citizens’
trust in public institutions, considering for example, the evidence which Deininger and
Mpuga (2004) provide from the Ugandan context. This evidence shows that business
enterprises, public administrators and citizen-consumers perceive that corruption in
public institutions diminishes significantly the level of institutional accountability and
the quality of service delivery (Mpuga 2004). Pushing this analysis of the Ugandan
context further, Fjelstad (2005: 17) argues forcefully that
“As long as the tax administration culture is perceived to be influenced by sectarianism, nepotism
and corruption, it is unlikely to contribute to the fostering of a more conducive taxpaying
culture…Tax legislation is unclear and causes random and partly ad hoc collection procedures.
Assessors have wide discretionary powers to interpret tax laws, for instance, to allow or disallow
expenses or charges, or to exempt items from import duties. These factors, combined with a
perception of limited tangible benefits in return for taxes paid, legitimate tax evasion. In such
circumstances it is not surprising that taxation takes place in an atmosphere of distrust and fear
between taxpayers and revenue officers…Thus, the government’s credible commitment about the
use of tax revenues and it’s procedures to design and implement tax policy non-arbitrarily are
crucial to regain legitimacy. The credibility or trustworthiness of the revenue administration’s
sanctions against tax defaulters is also important in this context.”
3.5. Reading Citizens’ Perceptions of Taxation under Low Quality Governance
Taxation is a manifestation of the political economy of a state, and for Blyth (2002:
274) “Political economies …are …evolutionary systems populated by agents who learn
and apply those lessons in daily practice.” And by its nature, taxation, as an economic
practice, appears always and everywhere to be a “contested concept” (Sabates &
Schneider 2003; cf. Roitman 2005). Thus consistent with previously outlined theoretical
ideas about taxation and state sovereignty, this  imagery of taxation as practice in
political economy suggests that citizens are thinking and active subject who engage with
the regulatory authority in shaping and defining the lines between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’,
what is legitimate or illegitimate, what is legal but easily acceptable or not.
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Consequently, taxation is anchored on a strong moral economy around the right and or
legitimacy of the regulatory authority to tax and this moral pre-disposition of citizens-
subjects regarding taxation has been shown to be a tenuous ground  that must be
constantly negotiated between the two parties (see Roitman 2005). Also, we have
already seen that empirically, good quality government enlarges the scope of citizens’
trust in public institutions, as well as opens further the boundaries of their moral
disposition to voluntarily comply with paying taxes. We equally reviewed empirical
evidence showing that this moral disposition to see taxation as moral and legitimate
shrinks in instances were the quality of government is perceived as low. But what
exactly does the nature of such citizens’ perceptions of low quality governance take?
Where could we find trace of them? When are they visible?
Citizens’ perceptions of state governance and or its institutions, as a product of their
memories built on past information and cognition, are primarily their opinions about the
institutional governance. In our concern with citizens’ perceptions of state governance
in general and payment of taxes in particular under conditions of low quality and
unaccountable governance, is  a prominent perspective that  sees citizens’ perceptions as
largely expressed by ‘defiance.’ According to Braithwaite’s (2003b), in which she
deploys her notion of “citizens’ postures” in her work in Australia, rather than
‘commitment’ and ‘capitulation’ as “postures” indicating citizens’ believe in the
“desirability of the tax system and their readiness to comply with obligations to pay
these taxes, people tend to adopt postures of ‘resistance,’ ‘disengagement’ and ‘game
playing’ in the context of institutional failure and distrust in both institutions and
authorities.
In Braithwaite’s (2003b) work, resistance was associated with citizens’ believes in the
illegitimate and uncooperative nature of the tax authorities (and by extension the state),
while disengagement involved even stronger feelings of citizens regarding their sense of
alienation from the tax authorities, hence the desire for withdrawal from the institutions
rather than seek a transformative challenge to it. Finally, game playing describes
citizens perceptions of taxation from the state as an amoral ground in which tax law
could be manipulated to one’s interests, since they generally contests the state’s moral
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claim to the authority to tax. All these three postures in citizen’ perceptions of state
governance as a whole and taxation in particular, expose defiance both as a reflection of
institutional failure and the unwillingness of citizens to cooperate with amoral
governance systems, unless coerced to do so. (Braithwaite 2003b; see also Ethan
Michelson 2007.)
But beyond these apparently non-extreme or unobtrusive expressions of citizens’
perceptions of low quality in state-governance and taxation levied on them, in other
instances these perceptions could be clearly discernible through protests and riots.
Bernstein and Lü (2000: 745) show that in rural China, excessive burdens springing
from “illicit and illegal” exactions from local authorities coupled with normal taxes
from the central government drove the people to protest against these illegitimate
actions from local officials, although they emphasize that these rural protest did not
constitute a generalized challenge to the regime. Especially disenfranchising were
grievances over the failure to deliver services paid for (perceived administrative failure
to use tax revenue responsibly and transparently) or the recurrent efforts at turning user
fees  for services into taxes and the attempts at imposing multiple charges for the same
service  (Bernstein & Lü 2000: 745). Supporting this citizen activism perspective in
China exposed by Bernstein and Lü, Michelson (2007: 4), arguing along the lines of
collective memory or in his words “collective learning” patterns, notes that:
“Historical experiences condition both the perceptions and the actions of contemporary actors...
In China, peasants’ economic well-being has been an enduring benchmark of political legitimacy.
When Chinese peasants popularly perceive the state to have failed to guarantee peasants’ basic
economic well-being and thus to be insensitive and unresponsive to widespread economic
suffering, an enduring cultural ethos calls for popular rebellion.”
Elsewhere, in Tanzania Fjelstad (2001: 294?295) upholds this image of an obtrusive
manifestation of citizens’ perceptions of taxation under conditions of low quality public
governance, as they actively engage in a confrontational stance against state authorities
by describing how:
“The deterioration and in some cases non-existence of public services raises taxpayers’
perceptions of exploitation from an unequal contract with government, and promotes tax
resistance. Widespread tax resistance is observed in the study areas. People may take to the
extreme to evade taxes, for instance, by literally hiding in the bush when tax collectors are
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approaching. In particular, the revenue administration in Kilosa DC relies heavily on simple
physical coercion to obtain the resources they need from their subjects and to ensure compliance.
Roadblocks, manned by the local militia or police, are frequently used as tools of tax enforcement.
Taxpayers reciprocate sometimes in the form of violent `counter-attacks' on collectors, burning tax
offices, etc. In 1996, for instance, the ward office in Chanzuru was destroyed during the night, and
the Tax Register Books were burnt.”
All these perspectives to citizens’ perceptions of taxation under low quality governance
in a state, show that these perceptions could either be discretely upheld by citizens and
only occasionally betrayed within Braithwaite’s (2003b) three ‘postures of defiance’ or
they could in other cases be observed as clear manifestations of citizens’ protest and
confrontations against the actions of institutions and or the authorities within these
institutions. In all cases, however, it is the local institutions and local authorities
representing the state and its national institutions that are targeted by local populations
expressing the perceptions they hold of the state of governance as a whole, or the
administration of the tax system in particular.
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4. THE STATE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN CAMEROON: THE
MAKING OF A NEOPATRIMONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE FOR
LOW QUALITY GOVERNANCE
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses and analyzes the process of public governance  from early
postcolonial governments till present, which show a long history of low quality
governance in terms of low quality of service delivery in public institutions, on the one
hand, and neoptrimonial and kleptocratic practices (corruption, mismanagement,
influence peddling, indiscipline of  civil servants), on the other. The analytical thrust of
the chapter is that all of these processes construct a historical trajectory of public
governance practices that has helped to build citizens’ memory of them as
untrustworthy and unaccountable. This is important in understanding subsequent
chapters that convey a strong sense of citizens’ alienation from public institutions in
Cameroon, thus shaping their perceptions of government actions and demands as, at
best, indifferent and at some extreme illegitimate. The chapter begins with the colonial
and subsequent historical development of contemporary Cameroon (see figure 1 below),
which provides a helpful entry into the subsequent analyses of Cameroon’s institutional
development, that reflects these historical-cultural antecedents.
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Figure 1. The Map of the Republic of Cameroon (Intute 2007).
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4.2. The Colonial Legacies of Administrative Experiences for Postcolonial Ideas of
Public Institutions and Administration in Cameroon
Cameroon as a colony from 1884 experienced the colonial administration of Germany
from 1884 to 1919, then those of Britain and France from 1919 when the country was
partitioned between these two colonial powers, and placed under their respective
colonial administrations until the 1960s. From 1919 when Germany lost the First World
War, most of her colonies were seized and kept under the administration of various
Allied Forces. As from 1922, these two Cameroon territories (British and French),
alongside other ex-German colonies in Africa, were placed under the League of Nations
as ‘Mandate Territories’ administered by Britain and France, on behalf of the League.
After the Second World War, in 1945 still under these two distinct colonial
administrations, they became known as United Nations’ Trust Territories (cf. Levine
1963).
The nature of colonial institutions and the role of public administrations that resulted
from the colonial experience in Cameroon, as in many other colonies, reflected the
military and economic targets of first the German, and then British and French colonial
powers. Primarily, the colonial administrative apparatus under German administrators
as well as British and France afterwards, was aimed at mobilizing all forms of resources
(mineral, agricultural or forest) for exportation to their various imperial centers in
Germany, Britain or France. Accordingly, within the logic of the political economy of
colonialism, colonial administration and its services were located primarily within the
coastal and central areas of Douala, Buea, Limbe, and Yaounde. Also, the design and
choice of location for public infrastructural projects such as power supply, transport and
communicative infrastructure followed this extractive logic, as they were only
implemented within these towns, and only occasionally linked the areas of the interior
to the coast by road or rail if some resources were meaningfully extracted from these.
Moreover, in its efforts to assert and embed colonial authority over the local
populations, the colonial administrative system implemented its tasks with a high degree
of violence that frightened local peoples. Whether in relation to the mobilization of
labor for the construction of public infrastructure such as rail or other utilities, or the
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collection of taxes from both poor farmers and urban plantation workers, the degree of
coercion was significant enough to portray the administration and all the news
institutions associated with it as harsh and brutish in the eyes of local populations, hence
to be avoided as much as possible (cf. Mbembe 1990; 1992b; 1996: 189?190; 2000;
2001). This preeminent role of para-military coercion in colonial administrative activity
is also an explanation for the strong wave of efforts deployed by the local peoples and
their traditional political authorities against German colonial authority, between 1891
and 1911, as well as against French colonial administrations, between 1950 and 1960
(cf. Eyongetah & Brain 1974:72?75; Mbembe 1996; Ngoh 1996).Thus, it is the threat
of military coercion that largely characterized colonial state-society relations. The
colonial administration, with the threat of military coercion perpetually looming on the
populations, embarked on forceful expropriation of native lands, resettlement of native
populations away from European settled communities for ‘health’ reasons, and coercive
collection of taxes, all of which spurred native resistances, especially in the towns of
Douala, Yaoundé and Buea.
An even more important influence of the colonial administration on the postcolonial
public administration in Cameroon was what can be described as a ‘culture of public
institutionalism and administration’ associated with the colonial policies and practices
of ‘indirect rule’. These policies or practices of indirect rule were supposedly aimed at
laying the foundations for an efficient ‘legal-rational’ bureaucratic Weberian state in
Cameroon (Jua 1995), and resulted in the gradual inclusion of Cameroonians in the
colonial administrative apparatuses, within the first notable effort of service delivery as
well as resource extraction by public servants. Indirect rule joined African authorities in
traditionally held or European imposed political roles to the colonial government, but in
a subordinate capacity.
But two aspects were reflected in the implementation of these policies of indirect rule in
colonial administrative systems. The first was the overt systematic distinction between
Senior and Junior branches of the colonial civil service. The racial segregation of
European and African officers into the Senior and Junior branches, respectively, in the
colonial administrative systems in Cameroon as in all West African countries, saw all
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Europeans of whatever educational level and occupation accorded senior status, within
the colonial bureaucratic hierarchy. Meanwhile, the Junior Service staffed by Africans,
whatever their level of education, provided the manpower necessary to perform basic
routine tasks as interpreters, clerks, messengers, lower technical personnel, the native
police, laborers, etc, (cf. Bennel 1982: 129).
These discriminatory practices in colonial administrative systems bequeathed a strong
legacy of the state and public institutions as a political instrument for awarding
privileges to racial or ethnic groups that hold power, in the aftermath of the colonial
experience. The ‘culture of administration’ that was transferred to the succeeding
African political elites after colonialism was  one in which public institutions stood
clearly as institutionalizing  complex hierarchies among groups  and favoring  the
‘ethnicization’ of public administrations. As will be explored further, the current
processes in which appointments in the public sector in Cameroon, as in many other
African countries, enable the appointee to reward loyalty and to recruit people from
their families, ethnic groups and friends (cronyism), emerges as a direct continuation of
these colonial practices (cf. Agbese 1998).
But beyond this legacy of discriminatory practices for recruitment in to the colonial
administrative service, the colonial public service also had another consequence in
establishing some elements of the current culture of administration in public institutions.
Indirect rule policies from colonial authorities was also primarily aimed at using the
traditional authorities or kings in areas where they existed, such as the ‘Lamidos’ in
Northern Cameroon and other kings in the coastal areas like the Bamenda grassland
region, the coastal areas of Douala, Limbe, Buea and Mamfe, in order to perform the
basic tasks of administration, such as collecting taxes, mobilizing their subjects for
massive construction projects, and daily conflict resolution among their subjects. Where
these traditional authorities or king did not exist as such, or where their authority was
weak or they were found to be too confrontational to colonial authorities, the various
colonial authorities created some alternative local leaders in various communities.
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The British colonial administrators created ‘Warrant Chiefs’ in several areas of British
Southern Cameroon while its British Northern Cameroon remained largely administered
at the local  level by their  ‘Lamidos’. The French created what known as the ‘Chef de
Canton’ (Canton Chiefs- an equivalent to the British’ ‘Warrant Chiefs’), after having
divided  a  lot  of  the  South  and  central  areas  in  to  various  ‘Cantons.  Both  of  these
categories of rulers, as the basic level of the colonial administrative institutions, were
given free hand in dealing with their subjects, as long as they remained subservient to
instructions from superior officials in the hierarchy of the colonial administrative
systems and mobilized sufficient taxes.
Whether it was the already established traditional authorities  like the Lamidos and
Kings of Bell Town, Hickory Town and Akwa Town in the Douala area and elsewhere,
or the newly created ‘Warrant’ and ‘Canton’ Chiefs, these local authorities exploited the
free hand given them by the policy and practices of Indirect Rule to perpetrate extensive
corruption, extortion and oppression among their subjects, a fact that has been verified
in neighboring British colonial Nigeria (cf. Afigbo 1972; 1981: 316). Taking undue
advantage of the authorities bestowed upon them through Indirect Rule policies and
practices, these local authorities orchestrated the imprisonment of innocent people, and
made some others to forfeit their properties, without any just cause (Isichei 1976: 145)
and were therefore able to grow rich illicitly. With much of the money which they
acquired through these means, they built ‘zinc houses’, storey buildings, which placed
them high above the entire community. Public office began to acquire the image of
amassing wealth at the disadvantage of the community. Moreover, as education became
the new instrument which could ensure the continuity of their children and these
practices in these institutions, which could only be acquired if one is able to pay the
required fees, these local authorities were among the few who could afford to pay them.
(Isichei 1976: 149.)
The overall implication of the colonial administrative policies and practices with
regards to the culture of administration in public institutions and the usage of public
power, was that public bureaucratic power could be freely used as a political tool for
discriminatory inclusion of favorable groups, for arbitrary practices such as unjust and
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unlawful taxation for personal accumulation of wealth, and for the intimidation of
opponents and or other subjects, through threats with issuance of arbitrary warrants of
arrests. Even more crucial, is that since this period of its early institutionalization, the
memories which citizens’ have of public bureaucratic institutions show traces of intense
frustrations with abuse of public office, on the one hand, and poor quality of  service
provision, on the other hand, considering that the primary goal of this administration
was to support the economy of their own countries and the lives of their people in
European metropolises, rather than the local people in the colonies.
4.3. The origins of an Authoritarian ‘Predatory’ Developmental State in the Early
Postcolonial State, 1960-1975
Retrospectively, we noted that the notion of a developmental state attempts to clarify the
relationship between politics, administration and development within a state, as political
leaders authoritatively deploy efforts to steer the state into a meaningful course of
economic development. We also noted that within the three schematic types proposed
by Evans (1995, cited in Edigheji 2005), it the developmental state is conceptually
opposed to a “predatory” or “rentier” state, in which political leaders wielding strong
political powers exploited these to capture economic resources belonging to the state for
their personal use. Also, it is important to keep in mind that the developmental state is
characterized by a structural concern with modernizing and development as well as an
ideological effort by the political elite at mobilizing support for its rule (Muller 2008:
113). As the subtitle above shows, the political economy of postcolonial Cameroon
from the early 1960s to 1980s betrays an odd combination of tendencies towards
predatory renteirism in the midst of a ‘developmentalist’ discourse.
The two Cameroons territories of the British and French saw different pathways to
decolonization. In French Cameroon, intense nationalist demands between 1954 and
1960, from the local Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) party from the South,
saw the French colonial authorities prefer to support a supposedly more collaborative
Northern Fulani Muslim, Ahmadou Ahidjo, to replace the Southerner Andre-Marie
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Mbida as prime minister, and to lead the country to independence in early 1960
(Mbembe 1992b). Thus, Ahmadou Ahidjo became the first president of ‘La Republique
du Cameroun’, a position he will maintain until 1982. As for the British Cameroon
which had both southern and northern strips, they were both presented with a UN
plebiscite in 1959, which offered them to achieve independence by joining either the
Federal Republic of Nigeria or La Republic du Cameroun. The British Northern
Cameroon voted to join Nigeria, while the British Southern Cameroons voted to achieve
independence as part of French Cameroon, as a Federal Republic. This was done in
October 1961, with Ahidjo from French Cameroon and John Foncha from British
Cameroon as Vice-President, even though this federal arrangement would later be
abrogated in May 1972 in an Ahidjo-inspired referendum.
From these early decades following independence, under strong presidentialist regimes
of first Ahidjo and afterwards Paul Biya, political leaders, through the public
administrative apparatus embarked on ambitious economic programs aimed at
enhancing infrastructural and general economic development. Paradoxically, in a bid to
consolidate their hold on political power, political leaders and bureaucratic elites
substantially captured the public administrative machinery and other state economic
agencies such as substantially state-owned corporations to enable their personal
accumulation of state economic resources (cf. Jua 1991; Konings 1996). These have had
profound implications not only for the capacities of public institutions and the state as
whole, but also for the image or understanding which citizens have had of such
processes of the political economy of the public bureaucracy in Cameroon and their
relations to it.
From the beginning of his regime, Ahidjo’s rule, under the pretext of quelling the
communist-inspired UPC political movement that had fought for Cameroon’s
independence, took a visibly autocratic and repressive form (Jackson & Rosberg 1982:
152?56). After successful efforts at this agenda, he promoted a cult of personality
around himself, in which he was seen as ‘Father of the Nation’ (cf. Schatzberg 1986;
Mbuagbo & Akoko 2004a: 2), as he would have himself called during meetings. As a
true pater familias, Ahidjo saw himself as the ‘guide suprême’ (Schatzberg 2001) who
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would lead the new nation towards development. Consequently, presidentialism for
Ahidjo meant the almost total concentration of power around the one person and one
institution that he incarnated - ‘la présidence’ (cf. Prouzet 1974: 151?86; Bayart 1985:
141?59). This meant that ‘his style of government was entirely personal and non-
bureaucratic’ (Gabriel 1999: 5).
Even if partly orchestrated in an effort to sustain his highly repressive and authoritarian
political system, Ahidjo adopted the so-called centralized or planned liberalism
development model, which significantly arrogated the power to control the allocation of
resources to the government (Mbaku 2002: 136). But during his rule from 1960 to 1982
his commitment towards modernization and economic development was quite
remarkable and as Gabriel observed, “generally speaking, the years from independence
to 1985 are considered to be an era of growth, whereas the ten years that followed are
identified with the ‘crise’”.
As early as 1960 when Cameroon just attained independence and in consistence with
French colonial policy of development planning, Ahidjo and his government elaborated
and adopted the ‘First Five-Year Development Plan’ (1960-1965), which initiated
ambitious investment projects spreading from agricultural, industrial, through social and
communications infrastructure to technological investments for innovation. The Second
Five-Year Development Plan (1965-1970) followed, with the aim of consolidating the
gains from the first. By the time of his resignation in 1982, Ahidjo’s regime counted
five of such ‘plans’, spanning a period of twenty years of development planning. By
such methods, Cameroon set up around 150 enterprises with varying degrees of state
participation and in most cases the state owned a controlling interest (Tedga 1990:
125?135; Konings 1996: 248), with the object of  supplementing private initiative or to
substitute for it where lacking. These government-sponsored economic investment
projects, typical of a developmental state project, triggered modest economic rates of
growth in the short-run.
Beyond these efforts at structural transformation, the ideological support that Ahidjo’s
‘Five Years Development Plans’ enjoyed was wide. Indeed, These trends in growth did
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not only reflect the fact that such a state developmental project was both “warmly
supported by the donors, and responded to real development needs” (Konings 1996:
248), but also contributed to stirring strong political support for President Ahidjo in his
future plans for hegemonic power over all political rivals, as he abrogated multiparty
politics by 1967. For instance, in invoking the need to ‘develop the nation’ Ahidjo’s
economic development program agro-industrialization, by being deeply located within
the ambit of his hegemonic political program, sought to use public administration or
bureaucracy and state corporations as basis for constructing a neopatrimonial clientelist
model of governance, that emphasized patronage. Clients owed total allegiance to
Ahidjo and non-allegiance was sanctioned with removal from public offices and not too
infrequently with person persecution. (Konings 1996: 248.) A vivid description of this
neopatrimonial culture of governance introduced by Ahidjo, is provided by Konings
(1996: 248?249), as he argues that:
“Loyal followers in the ethno-client network were rewarded by appointments and nominations to
state offices, access to state resources, and rent-seeking opportunities… Overall, the existence of
smuggling and corruption provided a major avenue for the President to allow supporters to
receive rewards…Special efforts were also made to appease and maintain support among the civil
servants or bureaucrats. They received excellent pay compared to the average income of the
Cameroonian citizens, as well as numerous perks such as free housing. Despite these advantages,
they were allowed to convert their posts into monopoly rent-seeking opportunities. In the context
of the patrimonial state, these parastatals were converted into prebends for Directors-General or
to serve other exclusive interests of the hegemonic class.”
A notable example was the case of the National Rural Development Fund (FONADER),
an agricultural credit institution created with farmers’ cooperative surplus sales to
provide credit facilities to farmers, but which experienced a disastrous collapse in 1997
as a result of the continuous provision of ‘unsecured’ loans to non-agricultural political
barons of the Ahidjo regime (Awung & Atanga 2002). Further, typical of our
conceptual understanding of the relationship between  state’s that derive their revenue
from natural resources and their models of governance, the situation of patron-client
networks was strengthened with discovery of oil deposits along Cameroon’s coastline in
the early 1970s. Almost immediately, the revenue generated by the exploitation of these
oil reserves by French companies was increasingly undisclosed by the president and
managers of the national oil refinery company (SONARA). The revenue became a
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private fund, remitted to undisclosed off-shore accounts, for the president to draw from
for his personal political machinations. (Awung & Atanga 2002.)
Understandably, then, as Gabriel (1999: 12) argues, such growth of the early years was
substantially fragile and eventually these government-promoted investment projects
usually through government corporations in the agro-industrial sector were on the brink
of collapse due to the  poor management alluded to above (cf. Tedga 1990: 1607; Fotso
1994, 159?64, cited in Gabriel 1999; Konings 1996: 248). These failures for the state
agro-industrial projects is partly explained, according to Jean-Claude Willame (1986:
112), by the fact that planned liberalism “was more a shopping list of desirable public
sector investment projects for interested financing bodies and industrialists than the
rigorous exercise in integrated financial, economic, and social allocation it was
theoretically intended to be” (see also Williame 1985; Moubanga 1988;). Moreover, in
reality, the enterprises frustrated private domestic initiative and often prevented the few
truly modern managers from rising.
The insights and processes reviewed so far, with regards to the early beginnings of
postcolonial governance practices, are understandably instructive of the nature or shape
of the organizational cultures that eventually emerged within public institutions from
the mid-1970s until present times.
4.4. The ‘Administrative Culture’ in Public Institutions in Cameroon under
Neopatrimonial Governance
The description of the early origins of authoritarian postcolonial governance as well as
the clientelist networks that president Ahidjo constructed around himself and that his
successor Paul Biya has upheld enables us to discern the value or central place that the
public bureaucracy represented for the local political leaders. By several indications,
processes flowing from Ahidjo’s neopatrimonial governance practices greatly relied on
public officials and therefore located themselves strongly within public institutions. But
the very nature of public institutions under such neopatrimonial networks needs to be
64
made more explicit, such that the entire scope of values and common practices or norms
deployed by both top officials and ordinary civil servants in public institutions could be
better understood. The most visible point in these processes is that the public
bureaucracy as a whole stands at the intersection of culture and power, of politics and
administration, in the context of early postcolonial state in Cameroon.
Regarding the concern with values in public bureaucracy, in both the basic Weberian
bureaucratic and the reformatory New Public Management (NPM) paradigms, Public
bureaucracies in ‘modern-administrative’ states are understood to have the values
associated with professionalism firmly embedded within them. These values speak to
the capacity of public institutions to perform state-designated tasks such as service
delivery within prescribed norms and rules as well as with “technocratic superiority” or
expected efficiency. For example, for Max Weber (1978: 217–26, 963?983), a ‘modern’
state is  in large part  understood to be ‘rational’ and ‘legal.’ For the NPM, the concern
for ‘professionalization’ of governance and public administration in both developed and
developing states seeks to increase the efficiency of the public bureaucracies by
boosting their ‘productivities’ (World Bank 1997; see also other professional enquiries
such as, Kickert & Stillman, 1996; 1999). Thus, efficiency stands as a central value for
public organizations and it is understandable that many states that see themselves as
‘modern’ should constantly emphasize this value (cf. Johnston 1982).
In order to achieve the desired efficiency and effectiveness in public bureaucratic
systems of the state, emphasis is placed on professionalism as a central norm or practice
of an administrative culture, and such professionalism underscores the devotion of civil
servants or public officials to the needs of the clients or users within clearly established
procedural legal requirements (Rainey & Backoff 1982; Synnerstrom 1998). Any
credible administrative culture in public organizations in any state that purports to
promote efficiency must therefore have professionalism as its core value.
Considering that bureaucracy, is the main tool in the state’s self-effort to construct a
modern “administrative state” (Riggs 1997), the focus on professionalism as a key value
is justified by the fact that public institutions are also the fields of actions or areas of
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pragmatic or strategic efforts by actors within the state wherein the society’s cultural
values and practices of power are deployed and expressed. For the actors that operate
and interact within public institutions in Cameroon, their actions (as expressive of
certain values) are premised on their understanding of what ‘the state’ in Cameroon is,
in the first place. Connor (1994: 92) has observed that the state exists first as an ‘idea’ in
people’s minds. This is crucial to understanding the logics and values of their actions
within the contexts of public institutions in their state. In quite practical terms, most of
the people’s ideas about the state and its supposedly neutral legal-rational
“bureaucratic” sensibilities are overturned to centre around the prospect of ‘consuming’
the goods or wealth of the state, or as it is put locally people are inclined to “chopping”
the state (Hasty 2005). The French political scientist who specializes on Cameroon
politics, Jean-Francois Bayart (1993), extrapolates this Cameroonian reality into his
argument that African political struggles are grounded in the logic of the “politics of the
belly.”
The public bureaucracy in Cameroon as in several other African countries is not only
symbolic of the reality of the state, but it  stands as both a symbolic and material site of
the state’s political and economic power which avails itself to competing groups and
enables them to “… accumulate, exploit, defeat” (Bayart 1993: 270). Once captured by
the most powerful group, the state remains only a façade of neutrality and becomes the
instrument for the construction of clientelist or patrimonial networks necessary for the
preservation of power and privileges for the dominant group, as has been shown from
the previous review of Cameroon’s first president, Ahidjo and his Northern ethno-
regional group (cf. Medard 1977; 1990). This reality of the postcolonial state reminds
deprived citizens of the practices of racial privilege accorded to Europeans as ‘Senior’
administrators by the colonial administrations as opposed to Africans who were
confined to the ‘Junior’ administration, irrespective of educational qualification and
experience.
In the light of these insights, then, a strong value in the administrative culture that links
politics and administration within the context of public institutions in Cameroon is the
unequivocal drive for personal accumulation or profit from the state, which translates
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spoliation into a crucial norm for the actors. As such, for Bayart (1993: 78) the
government in Cameroon, as in several other African countries, is that lucrative
business in which:
“Any official decision affords an opportunity for gain, from a fiscal control to a technical
verification, from the signature of a nomination form or a concessionary market to an industrial
agreement or an import license. Civil service departments and public enterprises constitute
virtually bottomless financial reservoirs for those who manage them and for the political
authorities which head them.”
For the top level bureaucrats, as for the ordinary or street-level bureaucrats, the public
office is a possible site for privatized accumulation, justifying the strong desire from
most youths to join the public bureaucracy, just as the old and ready-for-retirement
from the public office resort to all sorts of machinations to defer their retirement. This
interpellant function of the public office reflects the ever growing desire and efforts by
all (qualified and unqualified) to sneak their ways into the ‘public service’ system in
Cameroon, once an opportunity is announced over the national radio waves. The
country’s almost worshipped only National School for Administration and
Magistracy, popularly known by its French acronym as ENAM (Ecole National
d’Administration et de  Magistrature) has come to assume a prestigious value in the
eyes of all who are driven by the accumulative potency associated with holding office
within public institutions.
Even in the midst of the reduction in size of the civil service as well as their salaries,
under the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes which emphasizes the
reduction in the size of the public sector, many still gaze public officials with envy
(van de Walle 2001). As Gabriel (1999) rightly notes, watching news over the national
television (the Cameroon Radio and Television, CRTV) sufficiently ‘informs’ about
the social value of the public office, as “endless numbers of ‘fonctionnaires’ are
shown attending pompous functions, generally to install one of their own” (Gabriel
1999: 85).
Once in office, civil servants at all levels and departments enjoy almost absolute
freedom of action, displaying nonchalance, ineptitude, corruption and abandoning duties
for periods that culminate in years, while remaining on the payroll of  the state
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(Mbuagbo & Akoko 2004a: 8). In their diverse logics, translated in both their discourse
and practice of corruption, most Cameroonians have constructed ideas, values and
norms or practices about an administrative culture that strongly pulls public institutions
down from their supposed canons of rationality or legality and expected outcomes of
responsibility and accountability. They imagine ‘the state’ and its correlate public
institutions, merely as a fecund entity to be courted, lured and consumed (Geschiere
1982; Gupta 1995; Shu-Yuan Yang 2005).
Awareness of the exorbitant cost of such laissez-faire did not stir government into
action until the recent impetus from the World Bank and IMF (as precondition for
continuous support), where it is still displaying pedantic effort at curbing what by itself,
it has best labelled as “Operation Ghost Workers”. Given these and other banal
expositions of corruption and misuse of public office, it is not excessive to advance as
Charles Fonchingong (2004: 50?51) does that:
“The swindling of public funds by top government officials is prevalent and interventionism,
clientelism and nepotism have become the principles of governance…The famous 30 % that is lost
by those chasing dossiers or contractors paying for their tenders to go through is illustrative  of
endemic corruption…The administrative car pool of most ministerial departments is replete with
fleets of very expensive four-wheel-drive jeeps, most of which are not even used for government
duties but to drop and pick up the children of the boss, do his household shopping and run private
errands while workers in the same service carry out assignments on foot or public transport.”
In this context of bureaucratic absolutism and civil service impunity, the public office
and its officials, especially those in powerful positions are transformed into powerful
patrons (cf. Daloz 2005). In these pubic bureaucratic contexts where practices of
corruption, misappropriations and influence peddling are so banal, the prime
responsibility of public administration in providing services to deserving citizens in an
impartial manner is circumvented, making room for discrete applications of rules.
The implication is that public administration as the instrument for guaranteeing
citizenship rights and impartial provision of services is crippled, and such citizenship
rights are consequently subjected to arbitrary adjudication and too regularly denied
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many who fail, to secure the cover of powerful patrons within public institutions in
Cameroon. As a response to such displacement of adjudicative functions, from state
institutions (guided by rules and norms) to the discretionary powers of individual public
officials who occupy these offices, Cameroonians have become deeply suspicious of
institutions and now “trust in patrons” (cf. Daloz 2005).
It is these processes and their implications that have spurred the Cameroonian
sociologist, Jean Marc Ela (1995: 8), to conclude that as are conventionally understood
in modern administrative states “it is not evident that the concept of the state and its
related civil service has been internalized by most civil servants.” Following this outline
of the existing administrative culture in Cameroon’s public institutions, this pessimistic
observation from Ela is rightly premised on the marked absence of values and
professionalism ordinarily known as attributes of responsible and accountable public
bureaucratic systems. Moreover, the idea of a public bureaucracy insulated from strong
political power, as is required for a strong developmental state, is essentially
compromised by the strong linkage of those wielding political power and those in the
administrative system within patron-client networks for private accumulation. Many
people in Cameroon who pay taxes, either as personal income taxes or various forms of
business taxes have been only too aware of such a culture of administration within
Cameroon’s public institutions. But it is not until after 1990 when the country was
swept by popular demands for greater political liberalization and equitable redistribution
of public wealth, that people’s expectations about administrative accountability with
respect to public revenue began emerging at the surface of public opinions.
In the next chapter, the study appraises the relationships between such a broader context
of a neopatrimonial administration in public institutions, characterized by corruption on
the one hand, and citizens’ perceptions of the state’s usages of their tax contributions,
on the other. The study will also go on analyze the implications of such citizens’
perceptions for trust in Cameroon’s public institutions.
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5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MAL-ADMINISTRATION IN PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS: CORRUPTION, DISTRUST AND CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS
OF TAXATION IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN CAMEROON
5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents and analyzes the impact of amoral governance in Cameroon’s
public institutions, in terms of how this affects citizens’ assessment of accountability
and trust in public institutions, on the one hand and their perceptions on the payment of
taxes to the state, on the other. The chapter begins by exposing the nature corruption
and embezzlements that constitute amoral governance in the public sector, as well as
how the social forces of civil society in Cameroon, are crucial in defining the agenda for
anti-corruption efforts that the state has been obliged to pursue, in response for these
demands for accountability from various stakeholder concerns.
5.2. Amoral Governance in Public Institution in Cameroon: Democratic Reforms and
the Early Signs of Accountability
Most African governments are under the conundrum of poor public service ethics, as
these are intensely pervaded by bureaucratic and political corruption, embezzlements
and misappropriations. These have been shown to have severe negative impact on
public service delivery and social development (cf. Mbaku 1992). Cameroon is just one
of those African countries crippling under the effect of bureaucratic corruption and
high-place misappropriations of public funds. These two types of ethical vices in the
public service are often viewed somewhat differently in the morality of many
Cameroonians. On the one hand, bureaucratic corruption is seen with some
ambivalence, considering that while many may condemn it, they may also consider that
once one had paid huge bribes to be recruited into the public service he should be
entitled to recover such an ‘investment.’
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On the other hand, high-place misappropriations and embezzlements by politicians in
the public service are taken to imply the desire by these to render the entire country
poorer, hence the inability of the government to support workers on its payroll.
Whatever the case may be, since the country embraced a modicum of democratic
reforms in 1990 both of these forms of unscrupulous behavior in the public service are
usually widely known and often make the front-pages of private newspapers, since the
government press usually avoids embarrassing the state by reporting these. It is such
public knowledge of these phenomena that led Transparency International, the German-
based global anti-corruption Non-Governmental watch-dog, to characterize Cameroon
as the world's most corrupt country in three years, not so long from each other- 1998,
1999 and 2002.
Indeed, several illustrative cases abound in the private press showing how ministers and
managers of parastatals indulge in these ethically corrosive acts. In November 1999, the
SDF parliamentary group began probing on allegations that the then Minister for Public
Service and Administrative Reforms, Mr. Sali Dahirou, was involved in shady deals
and/or controversial contracts (The Post 29 November 1999). The results were not made
publicly known, and Mr. Dahirou continued to serve the government for long after that.
Similarly, the National Assembly probed Mr. Charles Etoundi, then Minister for
National Education, in 1999 in connection with scandalous misdeeds, notably the
allegations of his establishment of a ‘mafia’ through his teachers’ association, denoted
as Mutuelle des Professionnelles de l’Enseignement au Cameroun (MUPEC). This
association operated in collaboration with the publisher CEPER, in attempts to give
himself the monopoly of educational textbook production in Cameroon. This was in
addition to other charges of gross embezzlement and misappropriation. All he got was a
polite sack during a normal cabinet reshuffle, as if to avoid giving him public
embarrassment for such acts (The Post 29 November 1999).
 In another manifestation of high place corruption, the ex-Minister for the Supreme
State Control, Mrs. Lucy Gwanmesia’s sister was detained on October 22 1999, on
charges of “forgery, embezzlement of public funds and tax,” while Mrs. Gwanmesia
71
herself was accused of “wrongdoing” (The Post 22 November1999). This press report
argued that the charges were in connection with an illicit contract award from the latter
to the former, for the purchase of vehicles for the Supreme State Control. The first thing
Mrs. Gwanmesia could do, the report notes, was to send a ‘distress call’ to President
Biya, who it is alleged, ignored her. She only earned a sack in the next cabinet reshuffle
and the affair was muzzled.
It is not as if the government on its own has only been sacking these corrupt and highly
placed officials. Between 1998 and 2002, when it topped Transparency International’s
lists of the ‘most corrupt country in the world’ in 1998, 1999 and 2002, the government
of Cameroon has had to embark on a nation-wide anti-corruption campaign, under the
aegis of its newly created National Programme for Good Governance. It has also been
pushed by the international donor community, especially the European Commission
(EC) and the United States (US) government, to apply some prison sentences on those
top public officials accused of administrative wrong-doing, with regards to corruption
and embezzlements. For instance, in the case of Mr. Mounchipou Seidou, former
Minister for Post and Telecommunications, who was charged with misappropriating two
billions of CFA Francs (approximately three million Euros), he was sentenced to several
years of imprisonment in 2003 (Cameroon Tribune 1 March 2005).
This was also the fate suffered by Pierre Desire Engo, former Director of the National
Social Insurance Fund (known in French as the Caisse National de Prévoyance Social,
CNPS), and a staunch crony of the Cameroon People’s Democratic Party (CPDM ? the
ruling party). In February 2005, he was given a life-imprisonment term for embezzling
several billions of CFA Francs (Cameroon Tribune 1 March 2005). As a whole,
however, due to such token anti-corruption efforts and low-keyed treatment of public
officials involved in public bureaucratic corruption and mal-administration, most these
public officials felt no pressure for administrative accountability weighing on them from
the government itself.
Rather,  as  we  will  see  in  the  next  sub-section  below,  the  pressure  for  an  intense  and
sustained anti-corruption effort from the government on its public officials as well as
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the expression for the need for administrative accountability came from the media and
the church organizations, as part of a sustained civil society effort. Such civil society
demands for administrative accountability have mainly been possible because the
country had embraced democratic reforms in May 1990, granting the liberties of
expression to the media and easing the formations of political or other associations. It is
therefore important that I examine the nexus between these democratically-inspired civil
society efforts on anti-corruption and the actual anti-corruption efforts of the
government, in order to underpin their productivity in terms of administrative
accountability. This will help to provide a better background to how citizens’
perceptions of taxation are weaved in these complex interfaces of corruption by public
officials and insufficient response from the government.
5.2.1. Democratization, Public Bureaucratic Corruption and Anti-Corruption Efforts:
Civil Society and Government Efforts in Cameroon
Owing to its notorious previous unresponsiveness and an almost indifferent attitude
towards irresponsible and unaccountable public officials noted above, the government
of Cameroon could not maintain this position in the face of increasing dissent at the
conduct of high-ranking public officials. Thus, by 2006 the Government of Cameroon
had to cautiously roll-back some of its previously exuberant public statements, which
often suggested to both the donor community and the public at large that its good
governance programme and efforts were seeing great successes in re-building
administrative ethics and revamping the public’s evaluation of public institutions and
their services. This recognition of the continuous perversion of public institutions as a
result of corruption and embezzlements of public funds was acknowledged in December
2006 by the Cameroon president, Paul Biya (2006), who in his usual ‘end-of year
address’ to the nation, interrogated  and responded that:
“How come our country, which is well endowed by nature and the climate, which has
acknowledged human resources and which enjoys peace and stability, is yet to achieve its
economic take-off? We are aware of some of the reasons. The first stems from inertia in some
sectors of our administration. I have often denounced this ill, but it must be admitted that it is still
there. The second is due to corruption, fraud and smuggling which put personal interest before the
general interest. Severe punishment has been meted out to curb the scourge, yet, it is still lurking
in the dark. We will uncover it.”
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President Biya’s humble recognition of the truth of about the entrenchment of amoral
governance in public institutions in Cameroon eventually did come quite later; it was
due to the intense socially-driven demands for accountability in public institutions.
These demands were only possible as a result of the democratic transition that had
occurred in the earlier part of the 1990s. Indeed, in the context of Cameroon multiparty
politics was the main object in the supposed democratic transition, yet it emerged as a
popular struggle against the one-party state and a severe economic crisis that began in
the mid-1980s that led to adoption of the notorious Structural Adjustment Package from
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in early 1990 (cf. Jua 1991; Konings
1996).
Understandably several campaigns of civil disobedience that almost always enjoined
with mass demonstrations against the one-party regime of Paul Biya in 1990,
culminated in the promulgation of Law no. 90/o53 of December 1990 that granted
freedoms of expression and association, made the formation of political parties
henceforth legal, as well as gave a stronger impetus to the media in terms of their
protection against unnecessary lawsuits (Mbu 1993). But almost as this said
democratization had taken-off ‘illegally’ in May 1990 with the proclamation of the first
opposition political party in Bamenda, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), under the
leadership of the then popular John Fru Ndi, there was a concomitant deliberate and
visible government machinery that worked and schemed to contain the emancipative
and possibly transformative effect of such popular democracy.
Yet, given that this democratic transition provided some modicum of political space for
the  expression  of  freedoms  by  civil  society  groups  in  Cameroon  as  from  the  early
1990s, many did not hesitate to make critical comments on the way public institutions
are run and the prevalence of corruption in them. However, even as the efforts of many
of such civil society groups were helpful in bringing the government’s attention to focus
on the theme of good governance, it is the efforts of the church and the private media
that stand out most evidently. Many of the leaders of the mainstream churches such as
the Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon (PCC) were constantly
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making critical remarks and sermons against the actions of the government and public
officials, with regards to corruption (Akoko & Mbuagbo 2006: 29).
In this light the Catholic Bishops addressed a Pastoral Letter on Corruption to both the
government and their various congregations (Bishops of Cameroon 2000; cf. also
Mbuagbo & Fru 2003: 143). As evident below, this pastoral letter implored the help of
God in changing the morality of public officials in Cameroon in their management of
the public wealth, as they prayed that:
“Heavenly Father,
You always provide for all your creatures so that all may live as you have willed.
You have blessed our country Cameroon with rich human and .natural resources, to be used to
your honour and glory, and for the well being of every Cameroonian.
We are deeply sorry for the wrong use of these your gifts and blessings through acts of injustice,
bribery and corruption, as a result of which many of our people are hungry, sick, ignorant and
defenseless.
Father, you alone can heal us and our nation of this scourge.
We beg you, touch our lives and the lives of our leaders and people, so that we may all realize the
evil of bribery and corruption, and work hard to eliminate it.
Raise up for us God-fearing people and leaders who care for us, and who will lead us in the path
of justice, peace and prosperity.
We ask this through Christ Our Lord. Amen”(Bishops of Cameroon 2000).
These efforts from church leaders, though attracting donor and media attention and
serving as embarrassment to the Biya government, did not transform the morality of
public officials as was hoped and corruption went on unabated in the early 2000s as we
have described above. Thus, as part of the efforts of the private media to fight
corruption in the backdrop of this democratic space granted to the civil society, a private
newspaper, Le Front, published a long list of public officials both in active service and
retired, who had enriched themselves exceedingly as a result of their positions in public
office jobs. According to Le Front (9 February 2006: 3), the names and total holdings of
these public officials in foreign accounts were released by the American financial
networks, which also tracked economic crime, as shown below. Given that on previous
occasions when such high-ranking public officials have often been the object of open
suspicion often saw the President asking to be shown ‘the proofs’ of such suspicions,
the editorial also claimed in this instance, and with good reason, as will be shown
further, that as to the proofs to the veracity of these names and holdings, ‘Nous les
avons. Le Sommet de l’Etat en a les même’(Le Front 9 February 2006: 3).
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This list, which is reproduced in its exclusivity in the appendix, ranks public officials
according to the volume or category of their financial holdings (in CFA Francs), and
there are four such categories. The first such category, contains the names of public
officials who have cash holdings in foreign bank accounts up to and above five billion
CFA Francs (approximately seven and half millions Euros). In this category, fifteen
names are listed. Among these, five of the supposedly amoral public officials were still
in service (Adolphe Moudiki, the current Director of the National Hydrocarbons
Company, Polycarpe Abah Abah, who until then was Minister of Finance, Talba Malla,
Louis Paul Motaze and Remy Ze Meka).
Also, among these fifteen just two (Edzoa Titus and Pierre Desire Engo) had already
been prosecuted and imprisoned on charges of the economic crimes of fraud and
embezzlements, and it is worth mentioning that the prosecution of these two has been
widely interpreted in both mainstream private media reports and public rumors as
political victimization. The case of Edzoa Titus is illustrative. Edzoa, a man from the
same ethno-regional group with the president of Cameroon and who until then had been
variously, Biya’s private physician, minister in various portfolios and Secretary-General
at the presidency, it is argued that it is only after he announced his intention in 1996 to
challenge President Paul Biya at the impending 1997 presidential elections, that he was
accused of embezzlement, prosecuted and sentenced to serve a fifteen years term of
imprisonment (see for example, Ofege 2006).
Further down the list can be noted other prominent names like Achidi Achu and Peter
Mafany Musonge, both of whom had held the office of Prime Minister, a position
whose occupant is understood in Cameroon to be ‘Head of Government’. Both men
were placed in the category of people who owned ‘above two billion’ CFA Francs.
Prior to the publication of this list, according to Ofege (2006):
“Whereas IGERA, the State Inspectorate in charge of Administrative Reforms, in charge of state
auditing and control, has always tabled tons and tons of documents to the presidency and
specifically for the “Haute attention du Chef de l’État” about high corruption and misdemeanor
in  high  places  within  the  Civil  Service,  Mr.  Biya  has  never  been  known  to  act  on  the  IGERA
reports.”
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Nevertheless, almost as soon as detailed press reports of the nature discussed above
made sustained headlines in the private and international media, it resonated deeply
with the majority of deprived Cameroonians who have always known their political
leaders and administrators to be very corrupt and were only reminded of it.
This disclosure of deep-seated corruption among the high ranks of public officials from
the private media rested partly on the complaints from members of the Cameroon
parliament that the government was not committed to fighting bad governance in public
institutions, as well as  partly resonated with the significant efforts deployed by foreign
diplomatic missions  and International Financial Institutions/donor initiatives, aimed at
steering the government of Cameroon  into action on the bureaucratic excesses and poor
financial management practices in its government. With regards to initiatives from
International Financial Institutions’, as part of its efforts the Private Sector Unit in the
African Region of the World Bank Group published the results of its Cameroon
Investment Climate Assessment in August 2006 in which it argued that the investment
climate is not favorable to most investment firms (World Bank 2006a: 2).
Indeed, prior to this the World Bank Enterprise Survey showed that 53 % of firms
surveyed in Cameroon identified corruption in the country as crucial constraint to their
investment activities (cf. World Bank 2006b: 2). Diplomats also exerted some leverage.
For instance, only one month before this list of suspected public officials was released,
the United States Ambassador to Cameroon, His Excellency Neils Marquardt, in
January 2006 underscored the fact the excessive corruption in public institutions
undermines the chances of the country to attract foreign direct investment from US
investors as well as reinforces the already existing perception, held by the donor
community and Bretton Woods institutions, of Cameroon as a country under bad
governance (The Post 23 January 2006). In this same press article, Mr Marquardt (cited
in The Post 23 January 2006) is noted to have pointed in particular to the provision of
Article 66 of the 1996 constitution of Cameroon, which states that:
“The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, Members of Government and persons
ranking as such, the President and Members of the Bureau of the National Assembly, the
President and Members of the Bureau of the Senate, Members of Parliament, Senators, all
holders of an elective office, Secretaries-General of Ministries and persons ranking as such,
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Directors of the Central Administration, General Managers of public and semi-public
enterprises, Judicial and Legal officers, administrative personnel in charge of the tax base,
collection and handling of public funds, all managers of public votes and property, shall
declare their assets and property at the beginning and at the end of their tenure of office.”.
As the article reports, this provision, for him, is a “perfectly good mechanism” to
“safeguard wealth, which belongs to the public, and not to individuals.”  Yet, he rightly
deplored that despite this provision and in spite of the numerous previous arrests of
some ‘corrupt’ public officials, the problem seems to be the Cameroon government’s
unwillingness or inability to convincingly prove its desire to moralize public
institutions. Mr. Marquardt (cited The Post 23 January 2006) argued forcefully and in
accordance with what many believe in Cameroon, that:
“It is not enough to publish the names of those suspected of corruption or to fire them from their
positions. Those accused of corruption must be formally charged, tried in court and sentenced, if
found guilty. Their ill-gotten gains must be confiscated and returned to the public treasury from
which it was stolen. Cameroon must show itself and the world, that this type of crime does not
pay”
These growing domestic public awareness and foreign indictment of government
inaction towards corruption in the higher rungs of public institutions in Cameroon drove
the government to launch a new wave of anti-corruption campaign, code-named
‘Operation Sparrow-Hawk.’ Conceived in 2004 under the initiative of the current Prime
Minister, Mr. Ephraim Inoni (who is himself included in the list of corrupt officials) and
directed by Mr.Ahmadou Ali, the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of State in charge
of Justice (considered in the press report above as one the most rigorous officials), this
operation was directed towards ministers and directors of public corporations and
utilities who were considered suspects of administrative wrong-doing. The ‘operation’
successfully arrested and prosecuted and imprisoned key ministerial figures and
directors who were found guilty, as the few cases below show.
In March 2006, barely one month after the list was published and two months after the
open lambasts of the US diplomat, Mr. Siyam Siwe who was still serving as Minister of
Mines and Water Resources, was arrested alongside many others, for activities relating
to his previous duty as Director of the National Autonomous Port Authority, and they
were charged and prosecuted for embezzling 40 billions CFAF from shipping yard
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revenues. In December 2007 he was sentenced alongside his wife who was working in
this organization, to serve a thirty-year jail term, while other accomplices attracted a
cumulative fifty years of jail time. (The Post 13 December 2007.)
Following this episode of the Port Authority, several high-ranking public officials and
public organizations were subjected to judicial and administrative scrutiny, culminating
in further sacks and arrests between 2007 and 2008. Notable among these has been the
detention in March 2008 of the former Ministers of Finance and Public Health, Mr.
Polycarpe Abah Abah and Mr. Urbain Olanguena Awono, respectively, who had just
been sacked. The former has been charged with embezzling several billions of CFA in
value-added taxes while the latter is accused of misappropriating billions in donor
funding for the Global Fund for the fight against HIV/AIDS (The Post 1 April 2008). It
is important to mention here that all these ministers arrested and prosecuted had all been
prominent supporters of the current regime, and consistently been dolling-out portions
of these embezzled funds to support the political activities of the regime, such as
elections. For instance, during the prosecution of one these notorious public officials,
Gerard Ondong Ndong, who was director of FEICOM, the state investment fund for
communal councils in Cameroon, argued that he had been giving a substantial portion
of his plunder to ruling Cameroon’s People Democratic Party (CPDM) in campaign
contributions, as well as to the foundation for the fight against HIV/AIDs chaired by the
president’s wife.
In the midst of these arrests and prosecutions, in 2006, the Government of Cameroon
created a National Good Governance Program and a National Agency for Financial
Ivestigation, aimed at probing economic crimes, and established a National Anti-
Corruption Committee (NACC) as a replacement of the previous National Anti-
Corruption Observatory that it had dismantled in 1997. These anti-corruption and anti-
embezzlement campaigns and institutions, while drawing media attention have failed to
either improve citizens’ perceptions of public institutions and public officials or to
instill a sense of public confidence in the state’s capacity to genuinely engage in the
crusade of moralization of public institutions (Transparency International 2007: 15).
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This is largely because, like many previous anti-corruption/embezzlement efforts,
citizens and the private media have received these efforts with suspicion of them being
merely a political victimization of ministers whom the Biya regime suspects of coup-
plotting, without ‘meaningful results in terms of prove of the confiscation of the assets
and wealth of the culprits (The Eden Newspaper 30 June 2008). In the backdrop of this
prevalent kleptocracy in public institutions, the most important concern is what
outcomes it has on citizens’ trust in the government and its institutions in Cameroon.
Let me now try to gauge further how far these practices undermine trust in public
institutions in Cameroon.
5.2.2. The Implications of Mal-administration for Public Governance: The Erosion of
Citizens’ Trust
Clearly, then, in relation to our earlier characterization of the state in Cameroon as
mildly developmental and clearly tilted towards the predatory model, the prevalence of
these embezzlements for personal enrichment by high-ranking public bureaucrats
speaks even more forcefully to its neopatrimonial nature. Indeed, according to Bratton
and van de Walle (1997: 63?8), the embezzlements amount to one of the features of
neopatrimonialism which they characterize as the “misuse of state resources for political
legitimation” (cf. von Soest 2007: 627?9, for a similar analysis using corruption and
embezzlements as indicators of ‘misuse of state resources’ in Zambia).
Yet, the truncated, dispersed, and seemingly politically vindictive efforts by the
Cameroon government at curbing corruption by high-ranking public officials described
above are insufficient, considering the scale of the problems. At best, they can be
compared to the largely “enforcement swamping or campaign-style enforcement”,
marked by “periodic” crusades against corruption that Cheung (2007: 57) describes of
anti-corruption efforts by the Chinese government. Hence in Cameroon like in China,
such anti-corruption efforts can only yield periodic ‘deterrence’, without a sustainable
overhaul of high-place corruption, as to endow the regimes with sufficient political
leverage that accrues from gaining widespread public support and confidence when
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citizens perceive a real political will exists towards good governance, such as Cheung
(2007: 47?58) describes of Hong-Kong.
The exposition of these embezzlements of scandalous proportions within the public
space only compounds the problems associated with both policy failure and the dismal
picture of public service delivery we noted in the introduction to this chapter. The
consequence is that in Cameroon, rather than recovering lost ground in regaining
citizens’ trust, these efforts seem to be received with suspicion or are even seen as a
provocation from the government (The Eden Newspaper 30 June 2008). Most
devastating is that these scandals and public service inadequacies only “accelerate”
citizens’ distrust of the state and public institutions and public officials, a situation that
is comparable to the picture described by Kikuchi (2007: 193) for the state institutions
in Japan.
Indeed, a 25 January 2008 public survey 1200 Cameroonians residing in the major
urban centers by a Cameroonian newspaper, Le Messager (25 January 2008), found that
60 per cent of those surveyed are ‘not satisfied’ with the actions of the Cameroon
government, and for those between the ages of 21 and 29 years, the figure rises to 64
per cent. Within this same survey, with regards to the government’s anti-corruption
efforts, 42 per cent of Cameroonian citizens surveyed believe it is only a cosmetic
attempt by the government placate both them and the international donor community
about its seriousness to engage in good governance practices (ibid.).
Unsurprisingly, then, as many as 88 per cent of Cameroonians surveyed by this
newspaper think that the government needs to do more in the direction of curbing
corruption in order to convince them of its genuine desire to sanitize the Cameroonian
public governance system, and for them this should be expressed by the repatriations of
much of the money held by these public officials in foreign accounts into the
Cameroonian treasury (ibid.). These views seem to be supported by results from an
unrelated earlier GlobeScan (2005) survey of ‘Public Opinion in Africa’ contained in
the Africa in the New Century Report. According to this report, in a survey of 1009
Cameroonians aged 15 years and above, perceptions about corruption in government
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rank as the third ‘national problem after poverty and unemployment (GlobeScan 2005:
7).
The implication of these opinions about the actions of the government of Cameroon is
that citizens mostly distrust the government and its institutions. In fact, with regards to
the specific concern with trust, this latter survey  found that only 44 per cent have trust
in the national government in Cameroon, as opposed to, for example Ghana, where the
national government enjoys 87 per cent of citizens’ trust (GlobeScan 2005: 13). Clearly,
then, this shortage of citizens’ trust in government is a reflection of citizens’
experiences (long-term and short-term) with the excessive bad governance in
Cameroon’s public institutions, as most have become alienated by the poor quality of
service provision and the high prevalence of corruption and embezzlements by public
officials.
Many citizens in Cameroon, therefore, reasonably associate the state’s incapacities to
provide them with basic services at reasonable costs with the impact of these
embezzlements to induce budget constraints (Forje 2006b; see also Ndue 2005).
Echoing citizens’ understanding of the implications, the president of Cameroon himself,
Paul Biya, pointed out the devastating cost that such high-place corruption has for
Cameroon’s core developmental concerns: the fight against poverty and unemployment.
Echoing the same problem at his subsequent end-of-year address (see above), the
magnitude of the corruption among public officials compelled Biya (2005) during a
televised address on 31st December 2006, to bemoan that:
“There is something more serious. I am referring to corruption which I have often denounced but
which is still rife. There is a clear mismatch between our effort to alleviate poverty and the
scandalous enrichment of a few individuals. Public funds are embezzled, it should be recalled, at
the expense of the nation. I want t say very solemnly today: This must stop. The National Agency
for Financial Investigation was setup for that purpose. I expect it to perform its duty without
complacency. Such a drain on national wealth is intolerable especially as parts of our population,
particularly the unemployed, are still suffering hardships.”
The overall impact of this variant of ‘state capture’ on the developmental capacity of the
state in Cameroon is not only limited to the low capacity for public service provision by
the public sector. As a measure of the prevailing weight of predation put on the business
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sector in Cameroon resulting from public bureaucratic corruption and distortions of
rules by public officials, the  comparative World Bank & IFC global Enterprise Survey
2006 (World Bank 2006b) reports that 77 % of firms expect to ‘make informal
payments to public officials to get things done’, while as many as 50.81 % expect to
‘give gifts in meeting with tax officials’ and another 85.23 % of firms surveyed expect
to ‘give gifts to secure a government contract.’
The full impact of this corrupt institutionalism is that 52.05 % of the firms surveyed
identified corruption as a major constraint to doing business. The reasons given for
paying such bribes are diverse, ranging from efforts to avoid legal or bureaucratic
problems to attempts by businesses at obtaining preferential treatment. However, within
this criminalized business environment, the survey shows that there seems to exist a
wide consensus among companies that corruption imposes considerable costs on
domestic companies, as 63% of them assessed that about 10% of their turnover went to
‘facilitation of payments’ due them by the state for public contracts executed or services
provided to the government. (World Bank 2006b.)
How, then, do these corruption scandals and public perceptions of corruption in
Cameroon relate to the notion of a collective memory of public institutionalism in
Cameroon? Bo Rothstein (2000: 492) argues that these corruption cases are crucial in
building the collective or social memory of the actual operations of public institutions,
showing that they are untrustworthy and are avoided by the citizens (cf. also Gupta
1995). These perceptions of corruption represent both the ‘individual and collective
experiences’ of citizens and civil society group (Rothstein 2000; Rothstein & Stolle
2003) with the various components of what Olivier de Sardan (1999: 26?36) has
described as the ‘corruption complex’ that exists in many African countries.
With respect to collective memory of distrust in public institutions, then, by this section
has made a reconstruction of the historical trajectory of corruption in public institutions
and anti-corruption efforts by the government as well as public service provision in
Cameroon. The examination of the complexity of corruption and anti-corruption and
public service delivery within public institutions so far, has shown that ordinary
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Cameroonians and the core civil society groups such as the church and the private
media have come to see the inefficiency of the state and its institutions as bred in the
vast scales of embezzlements of public funds (cf. Rothstein 2000: 492). In the last
section of this chapter, I will show how by exploring public opinions expressed through
the domestic private press in Cameroon as well as in international media, this distrust by
citizens of governmental action and their awareness of the corruption and ineptitude
characterizing public institutions in Cameroon, can be seen as central in shaping their
perceptions of taxation of any form in Cameroon.
5.3. Citizens’ Distrust and Perceptions on Taxation: Anecdotes of Efforts for
Democratic and Institutional Accountability in Cameroon
As earlier indicated, taxation as other forms of social practices of the state infers the
regulatory authority of the latter, and is integral to the biopolitical technologies of
governmentality that characterise the legibility of power in all states. Mbembe (1992a:
9) observes that in the postcolony as was in the colonial domain, processes of extraction
by the state such as  taxes and other levies ‘proof the prestige of the state.’ Yet, in the
early years of political liberalisation in the 1990s in Cameroon, the tumultuous nature of
social and political protest, epitomised by the famous “Operation Ghost Towns”,
triggered by a coalition of opposition parties, were essentially economic strategies
aimed at bringing the state to shame. In addition to the customary social movements’
strategies of work boycotts and industrial strikes during these period, one also noted a
strong element of an incentive  to fiscal disobedience which had as objective to (and it
did) effectively undermine the fiscal or revenue base of the Biya regime in order to
force it grant some political  reforms (Roitman 2004: 198). In fact, at the core of this
collective action against the state’s economic capacity, Roitman (2004: 198) notes, was:
“… their criticism of the regime’s exactions and levies, which ultimately finance the ruling party
and political elite; the state’s methods of extractions, which are often heavy-handed; the regime’s
failure to provide economic opportunities and economic security to local populations.”
In the rest of the chapter, then, I will be exploring how citizens’ social memories about
corruption and the inefficiency of public services, are deployed in making these
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criticisms of the state, and how these are linked to the political space offered by
Cameroon’s transition to democracy. In addition, further analyses will show how these
social understandings of corruption shape citizens’ demands for administrative and
public institutional accountability
5.3.1. The Social Landscape of Taxation in Cameroon
Inspired by a French fiscal system, Cameroon presently has various taxes and relatively
their rates are high:  the top income tax (35 percent), the top corporate tax rate (38.5
percent), council tax (10 percent), a value-added tax (VAT), excise taxes, a property tax,
and a forestry tax (Heritage Foundation 2008). However, the figures translating the
weight of tax revenue as a proportion of Cameroon’ GDP seem to be inconsistent. The
Heritage Foundation (2008, cited in Mission Economique de Yaounde of the French
Embassy in Cameroon 2007) review reports this to be  10.4 % of GDP for 2007 while
Cameroon’s Ministry of Economy and Finance reports that for the same year
Cameroon’s budgetary revenue are divided as follows: 30 % from petroleum revenue,
10% from external sources and 60 % from fiscal-custom revenues out of which 18 %
are actually from custom revenues. Discounting 18 out of 60 %, leaves the portion of
tax revenue at 42 % in the 2007 budgetary revenue in Cameroon. This means that tax
revenue is the single most significant component of Cameroons total annual budgetary
revenue. This is important because in comparison with the previously explored
theoretical argument that states that gain more of their revenues from taxes are more
accountable to citizens and embark in responsible and efficient provision (Moore 1998;
2004; Rakner 2003; Luoga 2003), the high level of administrative unaccountability in
public institutions in Cameroon does not support this argument.
What is  vital to bear in mind here is that the previous section has shown that the tax-
paying citizen in Cameroon is quite informed and alert and socialised to the various
processes of extraction, accumulation and misappropriation which public officials
indulge in, even by forceful seizure and other ways of dribbling public wealth (Mbembe
1992a: 9). Aware as they are, the point for citizens’ apprehensive perceptions or
engagement in collective action against the state is not outright resistance to its
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regulatory authority per se. It is more about an issue of disaccord over the logic or truth
of the state’s [personified in the president] claims over the truth of its right to tax
citizens even if the latter clearly do not benefit from the taxes, a situation which
Roitman (2005: 5) describes by the phrase “intelligibility of its exercise” (see also
Mbembe 1992a: 5).
For example, confronted with the cited social movement that undermined its economic
capacities in the early 1990s the government constructed its narrative around the notion
of civility, describing these activities as “incivisme fiscale” (fiscal incivility) which fan
tax evasion and smuggling. Opposing this narrative, the citizens draw from the
discourse of democratization and rights to articulate their perceptions and actions in a
reversed logic of citizenship. Citizens therefore trivialize the state’s concern with
‘civility’ by arguing that the absence of economic benefits from the taxes they pay as
citizens frees them from any obligations to the state (see Roitman 2005: 5 for a detailed
articulation of various logics). Indicatively, Ntui (2005: 11), a journalist with a private
media outlet that the government often characterises as subversive media (les media
subversives), notes that:
“When government officials embezzle state funds and splash our faces wit their ill-gotten wealth,
it is all of us who pay the price. When salaries are frozen for decades running, it is not only the
civil servants who feel the grind. When government puts an embargo on employment for upwards
of two decades, it is the whole society that pays the price.”
This comment about the impact of corruption in the construction of social memories and
meanings about the state and public institutions reminds of Rothstein’s (2001a: 7)
earlier point that one of the two “cognitive dimensions of corruption” is that it shapes
collective “beliefs about government institutions” (cf. Gupta 1995). I will therefore
move on to examine how citizens past experiences of these social understandings of
public institutions in Cameroon are embedded in their perceptions of taxation.
5.3.2. Using the Democratic Space: Citizens’ Perceptions of Taxation in Cameroon
This background of cronyism and corruption by public officials must be contextualized
as the crucial nexus shaping citizens’ understandings and evaluations of the activities of
86
public institutions, especially their perceptions of taxation.   These citizens’ perceptions
are culled from opinions or comments expressed in various press sources in Cameroon.
Also, as mentioned earlier, in the midst of these irresponsible actions from top officials
of government the tax burden has increasingly become heavier on most Cameroonians.
For example already in the 1990s, a certain Mrs. Helen Letsendem (Cameroon Tribune
16 March 16 1990), a retail trader as many others who are commonly known as ‘buyam
sellams,’ explained that she felt
“…disappointed with the way business licences are levied…and I am expected to pay a ‘mixed’
Business licence known as ‘Commerce General.’ Yet after all these, I am forced to pay taxes on
different items in the store, from a tax on drinks to a tax on the sale of cooking gas. They have now
added the tax on the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) (state media) tax, whether you have
a radio or TV set or not.”
Complaints of this nature, about the way taxes are levied or collected is only one side of
the problem with taxation in Cameroon. The other side of problems with government
taxation is that of the rising rate of its increments over the years, and this in
contradiction with the fact that not only is the country under an economic recession but
also that since 1994 the government cut the salaries of public servants by 70%. Indeed,
following the government’s new finance law No. 2004/026 of December 2004, there
was a 0.5% increase in the value added tax (VAT), from 18.75% to 19.25%. It is to be
noted that only in 1998, the VAT rate was still 17% before escalating to 18.75%. Thus,
in seven years, the VAT rate has increased by 2.25%. (Cameroon Tribune 11 January
2005.) The impact of increases in these tax rates on general consumer price increases is
of crucial concern for many livelihoods, especially for the unemployed and those on
fixed incomes, but it is also a subject of contradicting discourses from the government
on the one hand, and from the civil society, on the other.
For example, the journalist Rosseau-Joel Foute with Cameroon Tribune observed that
immediately following this new finance law, and its increase in VAT, a bottle of
averaged-priced cooking oil formerly costing 800 CFAF now oscillated between 850
and 900 CFAF, and those selling for 900 CFAF claimed a price increase effect from the
wholesalers, who in turn accused the government over increases in the VAT. Other
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items such as rice saw a price increase from 50 to 75 CFAF per cup, for the lowest
quality. The price for a packet of sugar increased from 500 to 600 CFAF. (Cameroon
Tribune, 11 January 2005.) Similarly, it was noted that in the month of March, barely 3
months after the new finance law, the price of a litre of fuel rose from 495 to 500 CFAF,
while that of ‘gas’ increased from 276 to 280 CFAF, pushing the union of cab drivers to
force the Minister of Transport to increase the official taxi rate from 150 to 175 CFAF
(Cameroon Tribune 21 March 2005). On the other hand, in the midst of such price
changes associated to the changes brought by the new finance law, especially in relation
to the VAT, the then Minister of Economy and Finance (now accused of embezzlements
of revenue from the VAT and under detention), Mr. Polycarpe Abah Abah (Cameroon
Tribune 11 January, 2005) accused that:
“Cette surenchère est d’avantage le fait des spéculateurs, car comme on les sait, le taux de
la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée- TVA (VAT) invoquée par les spéculateurs  pour expliquer
l’augmentation n’est que d’un demi point.”
For most citizens who note such a tax burden to be matched by a near absence (if not
outright absence) of social amenities and other services provided by public institutions,
the understanding of the injustice of government taxing them while failing to
reciprocate with services is so strong that they overtly condemn government’s
continuous taxation.
An  illustrative  case  is  the  online  comments  by  Cameroonians  both  abroad  and  in
Cameroon, that followed the online publication of a press article entitled ‘Why
Government Should Not Collect Taxes in Kumbo’ (see figure 2 below). This article and
citizens’ response to it evoke very crucial links with various conceptual discussions
reviewed earlier.
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Figure 2.  An Extract of Citizens’ Views on  Taxation (Foleng & Bam 2006).
This article and citizens’ response to it evoke very crucial links with various conceptual
discussions reviewed earlier. Indeed, the argument in this article resonates deeply with
most of the crucial issues and theoretical insights explored in the analytical framework,
notably the question by Sabates and Schneider (2003: 4) on whether people demand
(more) from the government if they are made to pay (more) taxes.
                                                           ‘Why Government Should Not Collect Taxes in Kumbo’
By
Fr. Peter A. Foleng & Livinus Tal Bam
Due to the appalling state of the main streets in Kumbo Town, every visitor almost always asks whether the people still pay taxes
to the government. As the Bamenda Ring Road passes in the centre of Kumbo, narrowly missing a concrete electricity pole, the
municipal roads branch off from it at various points. Once in the famous Kumbo Squares, the road to heaven begins beautified by
undulating tracks, patches of tar and poorly paved gutters. Those who dress neatly must avoid Kumbo township roads in all
seasons. Moving from the Squares to Bamkika'ai, the newly created second motor park or to Tobin, the administrative
headquarters or to Mbve'e, the economic capital of Kumbo or to Shisong, hosting the Catholic Mission complex is a nightmare.
What wrong Have the Kumbo People Done
Last October, the Mayor of Kumbo Urban Council, Donatus Fonyuy Njong, used his meagre resources to grade the streets with
gravel and continued to water it in a bid to keep them useable throughout the dry season. These efforts have been dashed to
pieces, as the streets look like nothing has been done on them for the last five years. Apartfrom the increasing number of vehicles
in Kumbo Town, there are also motorbike taxis (bendskins). In a chat with the Mayor he simply said the government is behaving
as if it is not seeing it, adding that 'no one cares'. He, however, rejoiced that a friendly municipality in Italy, Citadel San Donato in
Milan, has agreed to assist in the tarring of the street up to Shisong. The majority of taxi drivers in the town regret that they spend
the day working for the mechanics because they must repair their vehicles every other day. Sometimes, they have to use
alternative and longer routes just to avoid the bad streets. These alternative roads themselves are not the best. Zachary Mbu'ye, a
taxi driver in Kumbo for five years, says the shock absorbers and tyres of their cars are destroyed rapidly and they have to replace
them regularly. This takes much money. Yet, they are not allowed to charge a higher fare. A bendskin owner expressed his own
disappointment:
We spend almost every single franc we realise every day on repairs caused by the bad roads. Given that the dust is
too much, one has can only imagine the paths to follow. We get into wrong tracks and often hit stones and
sometimes puncture the tyres. In the past some parts of the machines that fell out could be picked and fitted back,
but this is rare today. Once a part drops off, it is lost forever in the pool of dust. We also run the risk of throwing
our passengers to the ground.
The inhabitants of Kumbo Town inhale dust for almost seven months of the year - October to April. One would also notice the
effects during Church services as the majority of the people cannot stop coughing and sneezing. Women and their hairdos, and
school goers have their own stories to tell. For most students, they often fall in the dust; dirty their school uniforms and their
books. Some lose their pens, pencils and other school items in the thick dust. It is ridiculous to see a police officer standing inside
the dust looking like an exhumed corpse, checking windscreen licenses. If the government cannot take up its responsibilities
towards the people, it should not claim any rights from the same people. If social justice requires people to fulfill their civic
duties, like paying taxes, distributive justice imposes on the government the obligation to distribute in proportion the resources of
the nation to the needs, capabilities and merits of the people. This includes roads, and especially in Kumbo.
Selected Comments:
Comment 1:
How can we expect a government run by thieves for thieves to care about the basic needs of ordinary Cameroonians? The corrupt
enthno-fascist cabal in Yaounde only cares about one thing- stealing enough money to last several lifetimes. The absence of good
roads in Kumbo is a direct consequence of the mismanagement and thievery carried out by Ondo Ndong formerly of FEICOM
and currently at Kodengui. Hope he rots in there and also in hell if that is not hell enough. Posted by: Vally
Comment 2:
All of a sudden, the people of Kumbo are seeing what they should have seen years ago. A tax revolt looks ideal. Pay your taxes,
but don't remit them to Yaounde. Repair your roads with the proceeds. Paul's gendarmes will go away the moment their pay
packages are no longer coming in. The whole nation should stop paying taxes and see if the entire population can be jailed.
Posted by: Che Sunday (Dr.)
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Clearly, the authors of the article, as a reflection of the prevalent views among
communities in Cameroon, express deep frustration with their payment of taxes without
a demonstrated concern for the infrastructural and social development of the Kumbo
community. What emerges is an articulation of their desire to ‘exchange’ their taxes for
better roads and schools from the government (cf. Sabates & Schneider 2003: 4) Most
notable however, is the clear articulation by the authors of one of the relations between
accountability and taxation by the state, as we saw in the review of Gloppen and Rakner
(2003). The demands for social and infrastructural development of the Kumbo
community in exchange for the taxes they pay to the state corresponds broadly to
demands for ‘external accountability’, in terms of how the state uses tax revenues (cf.
Gloppen & Rakner 2003).
However, what is also clear is that this lack for development and the deep tone of
anguish embedded in similar lamentations by many tax-paying communities in
Cameroon, exposes the visible absence of any room for ‘revenue bargaining’ of tax for
development, between the communities and the state ( Moore 2007). This leaves these
tax payers disillusioned and hopeless of any chance of redistributive justice from the
state (cf. Braithwaite 2003a). Beyond the main argument and grim picture of the plight
of tax payers in this article, the selected comments themselves are an interesting object
for further analyses of the relations between tax payers and the state.  In the review of
empirical literature we were familiarized with the view that found support for the fact
that the unproductive consequences of the absence of ‘revenue bargaining’ and
‘reciprocity’ as well as the unresponsive, corrupt and unfair treatment of tax payers by
tax authorities, all encourage disrespect and resistance against taxation and tax
authorities in African countries (Smith 1992: 227; Fjeldstad & Semboja 2001; Feljstad
2004).
The first comment evokes the citizens’ anguish over the perversion of government by
corruption and how this lies at the root of the state’s inability to reciprocate towards the
tax paying communities in Cameroon by providing adequate services and development
infrastructure.  The  second  comment  is  an  outright  call  for  a  resistance  to  pay  taxes  to
the government in the face of its unwillingness or inability to use the revenues collected
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from taxes to improve the conditions of life for the citizens. Within the scheme of
‘motivational postures’, this call for a “tax revolt” by the comment author, Dr. Che
Sunday, moves beyond a simple ‘disengagement’ from the institutions to an outright
rejection of them, and visibly, “provides the rhetoric for calling on taxpayers to be
watchful, to fight for their rights” (Braithwaite 2003b: 18).
Framed in this rhetoric of ‘their rights’ as tax payers, such citizens’ perceptions of the
unjust and inefficient system of taxation have occasionally been aligned with their
actual behavior towards the authorities. For instance, during recent upheavals in the
small ‘Fiango’ market of a medium-sized urban centre in the town of Kumba, a protest
against “high taxes” was staged by traders in that market. During this protest the Kumba
Traders' Welfare Association (KTWA) promised to stage a peaceful demonstration
against the Taxation Department, the Kumba Urban Council and the Senior Divisioal
Officer's office. Prompted into action against what they found no longer tolerable, they
complained and threatened, that:
“We must seize our rights if it is not given to us. We shall sacrifice and let Government know what
we want and if our request is not granted, we shall swing into action. Traders have been turned
into paupers and the Government wants us dead” (The Post 26 February 2007).
Aware of the potential chaos that generally follows collective actions in this particularly
alert and often violent city, and frightened that these planned mobilization were geared
towards their offices, the Director of Taxation for Kumba, Issa Magellan Yadon,
indicated his delicate situation to the citizens, as he told them that he merely “follows
instructions from the hierarchy”. In similar manner, the Assistant Divisional Officer for
Kumba Subdivision, Simon Besong Ayuk, summoned the union's president to his office
for dialogue through a letter to the traders, in which he called on them to remain calm,
pending that “their grievances be looked into by a competent authority.” (The Post 26
February 2007.) Quite crucial, is the implication here, that government is not only aware
of the yoke citizens bear under the cover of taxation, but is also aware that citizens feel
they do not get the benefits from such taxation. Even more consequential is the implicit
suggestion that ‘competent authorities’ could do something about it, but have long not
done so.
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To conclude this chapter, then, I will note that this disillusionment about the state’s
denial of the benefits of taxation to the tax payers has recorded so deeply in the social
conscience in Cameroon that it is now a common theme in the popular culture.
Recently, a very popular artists in the country, Longue Longue (2006), in one of the
now popular songs entitled “Trop d’impôts tue l’impôts” (excessive taxation nullifies
taxation) contained in his latest album Le Libérateur Libère, he decries:
“C’est vous qui avez prêtes  serment devant Dieu et les hommes, que vous allez bien travaillez.
C’est vous qui avez prêtes  serment devant Dieu et les hommes, que vous allez bien gérer. Je
m’adresse aux enseignants, docteur, magistrats, collecteurs d’impôts, douaniers, élus du peuple;
écouter.  C’est vous qui avez prêtes  serment devant Dieu et les hommes que le pays va changer.
Qu’il y aura du boulot pour tout le monde. On voit que rien n’a changé. Les riches ne font que
s’enrichir et les pauvres ne font que s’appauvrir. Le pays ne fait que s’enfoncer. Les plus faibles
meurent du paludisme. Les plus faibles meurent du cholera. Où est donc l’avenir de ce pays?
Pourtant nous payons nos impôts. Pourtant nous payons nos impôts, mais le développement ne suit
pas. C’est le collecteur d’impôts qui s’enrichi. C’est les dirigeants du pays qui s’enrichissent.
Kilomètre 12 [a place around the major city of Douala] depuis vint cinq ans il n y a pas d’eau.
Yabassi, Nkonjonck, il n y a pas de routes. Pourtant nous payons nos impôts. Pourtant nous
payons nos impôts.  A quoi sert donc l’argent des impôts? L’argent des impôts va dans des
comptes privés et ne sert pas au développement de mon pays. Sanctionnées les. Arrêtez-les. Vous
nous avez promis le changement. On attend donc ce changement. Vous allez même changer quoi ?
L’argent des impôts vous ne faites que détournés. Avec les impôts que vous ne faites
qu’augmentées. Avec la vie que vous ne faites que nous compliqués. On attend donc ce




On the basis of an analytical scheme that juxtaposes the concept of a democratic
developmental state with the notion of a collective or social memory of citizens in
Cameroon, this study has explored the complex processes shaping the institutional
capacity of the state in providing citizens’ needs. It has also shown how these same
processes shape citizens’ assessments and relations to these institutions. To do this the
study has explored the crucial empirical linkages between the irrational processes of
bureaucratic corruption and failures in public service delivery in Cameroon, on the one
hand, and citizens’ distrust of these public institutions, on the other. These have been
shown to justify the negative perceptions and often outright resistance from citizens
towards a critical activity of the state? taxation. Thus, to the extent that public
governance implies “the fundamental rules governing the relationships between the
rulers and the ruled” (Oluwu 2002: 2) , this study has shown that more than anything
else, it is the social conditions of public governance (corruption and administrative
unaccountability) surrounding the derailment of these rules that have been crucial in
shaping citizens’ assessment and understanding of their relationships with these public
institutions and the public officials in them.
The first pair of crucial themes in this thesis has been the role of the state and its public
institutions in providing development to citizens who pay taxes, in a contractual
relationship of taxes from the citizens in exchange for development and infrastructure
from the state. This pair of themes elicits another pair of themes, the performance of the
state’s public institutions and citizens’ assessment of how much they believe the state is
fulfilling its role and can be trusted to continue doing so, or not. This second pair of
themes has therefore been about public institutional inefficiency and citizens’ distrust in
these institutions, as well as the mechanism that the citizens have to demand
accountability from them. All of these four themes have been shown to be intricately
linked to the powerful narratives of democracy and development embodied in the
concept of the democratic developmental state. Yet, these themes resonate deeply with
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the citizens through the notion of a social memory upon which the learning processes of
public trust and distrust rests. As an indication of how the social memory of public
bureaucracy frames such citizens’ assessment of public institutions in Cameroon, the
study has drawn from anecdotal evidence embedded in citizen’s narratives to show that
the perceived history of how these institutions and public officials have operated and
continue to operate towards them has led them to lay the blame for the shortages of
development within their communities squarely at the door-steps of the state (cf.
Bardhan 1997: 1333?1339).
Consequently the crucial concern for citizens has been to demand some measure of
administrative accountability from these public institutions and public officials, given
the opportunity provided by Cameroon’s transition towards multi-party democracy in
1990. Surprisingly, though, it is neither the legislative arena nor the public bureaucracy
itself that brought the initiative for this shift towards embracing greater accountability in
public bureaucracies in Cameroon. More than the mainstream and institutionally
expected organizations of public governance such as the legislature, judiciary and the
executive, the initiative for such administrative accountability and the reduction of the
incidence of high-scandal corruption by public officials, was and is championed by the
civil society organizations such as the private media and the church. These latter have
taken advantage of a key element of the democratic developmental state which is the
existence of channels for deliberation provided by freedoms of speech (Edigheji 2005),
to demand transparency and accountability in public governance, especially with respect
to public revenue collection. What is the significance of such broad civil society
participation? What does it indicate for the prospects of administrative accountability,
the building of citizens’ trust in public institutions and the future of state capacity?
building for taxation in Cameroon and Africa?
6.2. Summary of Contributions
The implication seems to be that increasing democratization in Cameroon and Africa
yields a deliberative space for the civil society organizations to strengthen the agenda on
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public institutional reform and the transformation of the conduct of public officials from
irresponsible and unaccountable leaders towards more, socially responsible and
accountable governance. In the specific case of Cameroon, democratic reforms, even if
minimal, have been shown to strengthen the capacity of citizens within the civil society
to demand administrative accountability from public institutions and public officials.
Hence it is reasonable to claim that democratization equally improves significantly the
prospects of the state to meet the developmental needs of various tax-paying
communities. In other words, through such active civil society participation from the
scrutinizing private media and the critical church organizations, public administrative
accountability of the executive branch of state government could be greatly enhanced
from below.
This popular-based accountability incentive contradicts conventional expectations that
administrative accountability can only be produced solely through the legislative and
judicial branches. As the case of Cameroon shows, these institutions are themselves
often entangled in the accusations of corruption and inefficiency. Thus popular-based
sources for administrative accountability are more broadly driven, as Houtzager and
Joshi (2008: 1) see it as “social accountability” associated with “new democracies
during the 1990s.” Their key agents are “civil society organizations and the media”,
thus enabling them to “use ‘voice’ to make state failures public and to trigger other
forms of accountability, including those exercised by legislatures and judiciaries”
(Houtzager & Joshi 2008: 1).
In the face of widespread bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency across the entire
framework of public governance in most African countries, this study has shown also
that the importance of citizens having a ‘voice’ in the context of a democratic
developmental state cannot be over-emphasized. Tax–paying Citizens as consumers or
users of public services in Cameroon and other African countries need to have a strong
degree of proximity to their public institutions, as well as a shared sense of ownership of
the policies of these institutions. This means that for most African public bureaucracies
currently crippled by the impact of scandalous corruption and inefficiency, the greatest
challenge is their willingness and capacity to foster a deeper sense of citizens’
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involvement in their policies and activities, by enhancing citizens’ access to information
on public spending and providing wider opportunities for them to denounce wrong-
doing from public officials.
This point, I think, has begun to resonate in Cameroon. For instance, in October 2008
the Director General of the National Directorate of Taxation, Laurent Nkodo, launched
a new online service in his department that facilitates citizens’ reporting of cases of
harassment, fraud and other abuses by tax agents to officials of the Taxation Department
in Yaounde (The Post 13 October 2008). As public institutions shift towards greater
citizens’ oversight, this will signal a general impression on citizens that these
institutions have adopted a more performance-based approach to public management as
they are open for scrutiny and demands for accountability. This performance
management orientation as the core of the new ‘public policy management’ (cf. Pollitt
& Boucaert 2004) for African public bureaucracies, can produce and enhance a double
sense of trust in citizens. The first is a processed-based trust deriving from repeated
exchanges between citizens and government agencies, and the second is institutional
trust deriving from the confidence in governmental regulation that ensure accountability
and responsibility in public institutions (Zuker 1986).
While it is true that citizens’ involvement or participation in public policy-making and
implementation is also dependent on the trust that public administrators have that
citizens’ involvement in the policy-making and implementation processes does not
obstruct but enhance the policy outcomes (Kaifeng Yang 2005; 2006: 575;Wang &
Wart 2007), this only underscores the point that the production and maintaining of
citizens’ trust in public institutions is a joint responsibility for both citizens and public
administrators. Most importantly, this sense of mutual trust will not only enhance
citizens’ capacities to demand even more accountability from the government as well as
enable them to define more clearly the needs of their communities, it will also enhance
the capacity of the state’s institutions to respond to these multiple levels of
accountability and the needs of these tax-paying communities (Heikkilä 2007; Wang &
Wart 2007).
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In this line, then, there is also hope that African public bureaucracies can greatly buy a
better stock of public legitimacy for themselves and for the state in general, reducing or
outrightly eliminating the current animosities which citizens habor towards taxation
from the state. As a whole, then, this study has shown that the ability of civil society to
press for social accountability in public institutions can greatly be strengthened when
these civil society organizations are better structured, for instance as the church is, and
this promises to add social accountability to other forms of institutionally expected
sources of governmental accountability such as the legislature and the judiciary.
6.3. Future Research
This study has shown how the current context of low quality governance produces
citizen’s distrust and negative perceptions of the payment of taxes to an ineffective
government. But the study has also underlined that given progressive democratic
reforms, it is the joint responsibility of both the public administrators and citizens to
produce a climate of trust and accountability that fosters productive public institutions.
However, what remains uncertain is how both public administrators and citizens in
Cameroon in particular and Africa in general, can effectively engage each other in very
synergic rather than confrontation ways. Thus, pertinent questions still need to be
examined.
For instance, in order to foster its legitimacy to tax citizens we have seen that public
administrators must prioritize citizen’s needs and aspirations, but how can public
administrators effectively consult or involve citizens’? Is it by administrative and
service decentralization or by merely holding meetings with community groups only to
hijack back the process of policy-making and implementation at higher levels of public
bureaucracy? What role can mechanisms of complaint and redress play in building
confidence among citizens, administrators, and institutions? Do such mechanisms of
complaint exist already? If so how can they be broadened and strengthened, to make
them more inclusive and participative?
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Even though this study has provided a detailed and critical examination of the social
conditions of public governance in Cameroon, with regards to citizen’s trust in public
institutions and their perceptions of taxation, these questions are not pursued in this
thesis. Nonetheless, this study can serve as an important basis for subsequent research
on questions such as these, so as to continuously help make the impact of research on
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